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CHAIRMAN ALISTER McALISTER: Good morning. The interim 
committee meeting of the Finance and Insurance Committee will come 
to order. During the last legislative session there were numerous 
bills introduced to modify the existing law that applies to 
California real property transactionso Some of these bills were 
successful but probably the majority of those bills proposed were 
not successful and there are many critical issues that remain un-
resolved and this, of course, coupled with the inflation and high 
interest rates creates or has given rise to many problems that 
confront our society. 
Originally there were two and then four bills that 
provided the main thrust for the statewide hearings on the real 
property finance conducted by this Committee. Senator Gregorio's 
SB 200 would have enacted restrictions on the use of the due-on-
sale clause, as well as restrictions on prepayment penalties. 
Senator Carpenter's SB 1244 proposed a different formula for 
limiting prepayment penalties. Assemblyman Hayden's AB 2114, as 
amended in the Senate, would have enacted the same provisions in 
regard to prepayment penalties as SB 200, and would have slightly 
restricted use of the due-on-sale clause. Finally, Assemblyman 
Deddeh's AB 105 would have placed statutory limitations on the 
amount of the late charges which may be assessed on installment 
loans on single-family, owner-occupied dwellings. None of these 
four bills, however, was enacted. 
The Committee, at the request of many persons and after 
the original dates were set, agreed to expand the subject matter 
of the hearings beyond the question of prepayment penalties and the 
due-on-sale clause and late charges to cover the entire area of 
real estate transactional costs. We expect public testimony on 
many topics including such important topics as interest rates and 
the usury law, real estate brokerage commissions, finder's fees, 
appraisal fees, escrow charges, title insurance costs, "points", 
and other loan fees, loan assumption charges, and other important 
issues. 
Before we commence, I would like to introduce Assembly-
man Hayden, who is with me today, and I'm sure there will be other 
members of the Committee who will come along. Chief Counsel 
carlyle Brakensiek is sitting immediately to my right and to my 
left and your right is the Committee Secretary Betty Yearwood and 
my Administrative Assistant Sal Bianco. 
Our first witness today will be Mr. Sean McCarthy from 
the California Land Title Association. 
MR. SEAN McCARTHY: Mr. Chairman and members of the 
Committee, I'm Sean McCarthy, Vice President and Legislative Counsel 
of the california Land Title Association. I appear here today in 
that capacity. The CLTA is a trade association comprised of all 
title insurers licensed and actively conducting the business of 
title insurance in this state. The Association is in the final 
stages of preparation of a formal statement which, with the per-
mission of the Chairman, we would request incorporating into the 
record upon my submission of that report. 
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CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Very good. 
MR. McCARTHY: In my formal testimony today, I would 
like to highlight some of the information contained in this formal 
statement in which the CLTA has attempted to anticipate and answer 
a number of questions about the title industry which have been 
raised in other forums and in the press. I will also attempt to 
respond to any questions which the members of this Committee might 
direct. 
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, as you are 
all well aware, the subject of these hearings involves issues that 
are both broad and complex, encompassing all costs associated with 
the consummation and financing of real property transactions. The 
CI·TA perceives that a thorough study of these issues will neces-
sarily direct the Committee's inquiry into many of the same areas 
already studied at the federal level in the course of the past five 
years. Although, of course, the thrust of this Committee's efforts 
will be to define and identify California problems and develop 
solutions for california problems, not federal problems, the defi-
nitional framework adopted and used at the federal level in their 
investigation of costs associated with the acquisition and financing 
of real property is directly applicable to this committee's investi-
gation. We respectfully suggest that your difficult task might be 
advanced substantially if you were to employ this definitional 
framework during the course of your hearings and to aid the Com-
mittee's perspective on the various components of real estate 
settlement costs in California. 
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The subject of inquiry at the federal level has been 
what are termed mortgage settlement costs. The most thorough and 
comprehensive study of such costs is contained in a document en-
titled "Report on Mortgage Settlement costs", published jointly by 
the u. s. Department of Housing and urban Development and the 
Veterans Administration in January, 1972, and commonly referred to 
as the HUD-v.A Report. The data for the study were taken from over 
50,000 FHA and VA transactions during the month of March, 1971. 
While we realize that one must go carefully about drawing conclu-
sions from data now almost four years old, the definitional frame-
work and the empirical data in which the HUD-VA Report combine to 
provide a useful tool in pinpointing the components of settlement 
costs and for understanding the relative importance of each of 
these components in the consummation and financing of real property 
transactions. 
One further caveat regarding the HUD-v.A Report, some, 
including members of the title industry, have criticized the 
methodology applied by HUD-VA in reaching certain conclusions in 
their report. We of CLTA do not suggest that all of the report's 
findings and conclusions are warranted. We commend the report to 
this Committee solely on the basis of a definitional framework 
adopted by the federal agencies in their studies and also the basic 
empirical data upon which their report was based. 
The HUD-VA definitional framework involves three 
fundamental concepts: closing costs, settlement costs, and title-
related costs. It is extremely important to this conceptual 
framework to note that the all-inclusive term is settlement costs; 
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that is, settlement costs include closing costs and, in turn, 
includes title-related costs. 
In order to facilitate your understanding of this 
framework we have prepared this chart which is a compilation of all 
California data that was used in the HUD-VA report of all cases 
studied. Now, on this chart, I have shown how, according to the 
HUD-VA approach, these three fundamental concepts relate to one 
another. The largest bracket on the right indicates the concept 
of settlement costs including all 16 components of costs associated 
with the conveyance of real property. 
And the next multibracket indicates the closing cost 
which includes, in turn, title-related costs. 
Now, within the segments of the bar, we have listed 
components of the studies of the HUD-VA, thereby aggregating all 
16 of these cost components which are able to come up with the 
composite term settlement costs. 
Now, as I noted earlier, this bar is constructed for 
what was termed the average transaction representing all california 
cases, which HUD-VA collected in March, 1971. For that average 
- ------. 
California transaction, the total settlement costs amounted to 10.89 
percent of the sales price of the homeo 
Mr . Chairman, by any test, .10.89 percent of sal~s 
. ' . 
price is a substantial sum of money and a significant economic 
barrier to home ownership. We, in the title industry, recognize 
and are concerned about any factors that discourage home ownership. 
We, therefore, deeply share your concern over the extent to which 
settlement costs may operate to inhibit or completely frustrate 
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the desire of consumers to achieve home ownership. But, Mro Chair-
man, we are likewise concerned over the apparent misunderstandings 
that have arisen regarding the extent of the title insurance indus-
try's contributions to the high cost of home acquisition. It has 
---~---·~----
been sugg~~t~d that the title industry is one of the major contrib-
----··· uting factors to high settlement costs in california. An analysis 
of the various components of settlement costs in California will 
demonstrate that this allegation is simply not true. 
If I may refer your attention back to the chart, you 
can see that loBS percent of the sales price has been allocated to 
the so-called title-related costs. You will also see that this 
-- --- . ·- .. - ..... . . 
category of settlement costs is comprised of six distinct componentso 
. . . 
These are"title examination, title insurance, escrow fees, closing 
fees, document preparation, and a catch-all category "other closing 
costs". 
Mr. Chairman, in those cases where the title industry 
does not, and I emphasize does not, perform the escrow or closing 
functions, the only two components of title-related costs, indeed 
of entire settlement costs, in which the title industry is involved, 
are title examination and title insurance. And, according to the 
data in the HUD-VA Report, the total cost of title examination and 
title insurance for the average California transaction amounted to 
$165, or .074% out of the total of 10o8~~ for settlement costso 
Moreover, of that $165, approximately $30 to $35 is for title in-
surance costs associated with special coverage requirements of 
· ___ -·- ...... -~. -- . 
the lending industry and, while necessary though, they may be they 
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nevertheless operate to increase the cost to the horne purchaser-
borrower. 
Looking at that same average california transaction in 
another way, on a horne that sold in March of 1971 for $22,000, 
,...---····· -· -···-··-· --·- --·. -- - -· . . -· ·· 
total settlement costs were $2,420o The real estate commission, 
discount points and prepaid items accounted for $1,743 or 7.80% of 
the sales price. Another $273 or 1.23% went for survey fees, 
credit reports, termite inspection, HUD-VA appraisal fees, record-
ing fees, and state and local transfer taxes. The fee for escrow 
services, closing fee , document preparation charge and other clos-
ing costs Category D here -- amounted to $239 or 1.11% of the 
sales price. Title insurance and title examination combined 
r-----·-· ----- ~···· .. . - .. -
amounted to $165 or 0.74% of the sales price. 
As I stressed earlier, Mr. Chairman, the foregoing 
breakdown depicting the title industry's relatively small contri-
·bution to settlement costs was predicated on the assumption of no 
industry involvement in the escrow or closing function. 
I would now like to address my remarks to the industry's 
role in total settlement costs where these services are performed 
by a member of our industry. 
The HUD-VA Report refers to a sub-study of title-
related costs in 12 major metropolitan areas in the United States~ 
using the same March, 1971 data. Los Angeles County was one of 
those 12 areas. It is probably an understatement to say that the 
report is highly critical of many Los Angeles practices brought to 
light in this sub-study. We would now like to demonstrate that 
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these criticisms should be directed to industries other than the 
title industry. 
At the outset it should be noted that it is difficult 
to compare all the Los Angeles data with the statewide data for 
California because the report does not give the same detailed 
statistical breakdown of the statewide data on title-related cost 
components as it does for the Los Angeles sub-studyo With this 
caveat, I refer your attention to Chart 2, which schematically 
illustrates the Los Angeles problem. 
On this chart, the center bar represents the same 1.85% 
and was derived from the average california transaction analysis. 
Bear in mind, this chart depicts only title-related costs, or 1.85% 
of total settlement costs amounting to 10o8~~ of sales price. In 
the center bar, we have shown the $165 or 0.74% for title insurance 
out of the total title-related costs of $404 for the average 
california transaction. 
Now, the bar on the left depicts the Los Angeles sub-
study. Total title-related costs in Los Angeles were found to be 
$436 or 2.1~~ of the selling price. 
Breaking this sum into its component parts the report 
indicates the cost of title insurance and title examination was 
$165 -- the same amount as in the statewide averageo However, the 
other title-related costs, one or more of the remaining cost com-
ponents in combination result in a much higher cost to the consumer 
than in the statewide sample. Escrow fees are $148 and document 
preparation fees, $14, and in the catch all category and other 
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c.t_osi!!9 cos~~-q.mQl.J.Il:ting__i;;Q ___ ~-~9~0 It is these cost components that 
make up the $271 difference between total title-related costs in 
the Los Angeles sub-study of $436 and the $165 for title insurance. 
As was pointedout earlier, there is no detailed break-
down for other components -- for these other components on a state-
wide basis and it is therefore difficult to accurately depict their 
relative role in the center barD But one thing is quite clear, one 
or more of these costs would have to be lower in order to come 
within the statewide average . 
There is information i n the HUD-VA Report in direct 
support of the propositi on t hat title-related costs in certain 
other areas of California approach the relatively high level of 
the Los Angeles pattern if indeed they do not duplicate it. And 
-~- ·---
there is still also other data to indicate in other areas of 
calirornia._the ~~~~~~~-®. eyerag.e .of $404 or 1.85% for title"':'related 
cos_'t:._~- - -~ -~-- -~a;r too high. The bar on the right represents schematically 
all those other areas of california where title-related costs are 
lower. 
Mr. Chairman, it is common knowledge, and borne out 
by the rate-filings of the California title industry -- which are 
a matter of public record on file in the Department of Insurance --
-- ··----· ....... --.. --.. ·-6 __ , .. ..., .. _.,.. __ ,,_.. ... _, ~ ..... ...... - ... · .. ~·------- ... ·-··-··---·-----... ................... ·-
that when the escrow or closing function in a real estate settlement 
is performed by the title industry~ these remaining cost components 
of title-related costs, other than title insurance and title exam-
ination would have been far less in 1971 than the $271 they cost in 
Los Angeles, and also far less than the $239 they cost in the state-
wide average transaction. This fact is still true todayo Therefore, 
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we submit that the bar on the right is schematically a more accurate 
reflection of the title industry's relative cost-involvement when 
it handles the escrow or closing function. 
On examination, however valid the criticisms in the 
HUD-VA Report relating to the title-relating costs and services in 
the Los Angeles sub-study may be, these criticisms must be directed 
not to the title industry, but at other industries which handle 
escrows and closings in that area, and this is principally due to 
the fact that in approximately 95% of the transactions comprising 
the Los Angeles data base, the escrow and closing function were 
performed by industries other than the title industry and that 
figure is not much changed today. Certainly less than 10% of all 
escrow and closing services in Los Angeles today are performed by 
the title industry. 
Hopefully, Mr. Chairman, the foregoing has helped you 
and the members of this Committee to place in proper perspective 
the cost involvement, both in dollars and as a percent of sales 
price, of the title industry in the entire spectrum of settlement 
costso The data show that title insurance and title examination 
costs in california are but a small part of overall settlement 
costs in this State. Notwithstanding this fact, the industry has 
come in for a lot of criticism. 
One critic at the federal level is on record as having 
stated, and I quote: "Less than 3% of the title industry's pre-
,_ 
m~ums are paid out in losses, s~ it seems to me this could almost 
be construed as a 97% ripoff." 
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\ Another critic has stated that, "It should take only 
l 
15 minutes to transfer title to a $40,000 home and that should not 
cost any more than to transfer title to a car, which also takes 
only 15 minutes." 
Mr. Chairman, the answers to both these criticisms lie 
in important differences. And, in attempting to provide you and 
the members of your Committee with those answers we hope to enable 
you to better understand what title insurance is, why it is needed, 
and most importantly, exactly what the consumer gets for his dollar, 
for the $165 represented in Charts I and II. 
In the case of the 3% loss factor, which incidentally 
~pproximates 5% and not 3%, the answer is the vast difference in 
, __ ... --... . . p_ ........ ~-- ........... --·~ ... -, ....... . 
kind between the casualty insurance business and the title insurance 
business: fundamental differences in the expectations of consumers 
when they purchase a policy of title insurance as opposed to a 
policy of casualty insurance. A home buyer expects and receives 
assurances that upon assuming title to real property the rights of 
his predecessors in ownership and all other persons or public 
agencies having an interest in that property ••• 
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN: Excuse me, Mr. Chairman, may I 
ask a question here? 
You went over that rather rapidly about a 3% which ap-
proximates 5%. Could you give an illustration of what you're talk-
ing about in that particular instance? 
MR. McCARTHY: The statistical data submitted in 
California would indicate that the loss ratio for California title 
insurers approximates a 5% loss factor, as opposed to 3%. The 
--~- --
- ........... . 
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proposal in my testimony didn't indicate exactly why that's the 
case . 
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN: You will cover that? 
MR. McCARTHY: Yes, sir o 
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN: All right . Very good. 
CHAIRMAN MCALISTER: You will tell us why 3% is really 
5%? 
MR. McCARTHY: Oh, excuse meo No, the person who made 
this statement used it as an illustration to support his contention 
that the title industry is, in his terms, a 11 ripoff", and when I 
proposed it, it was to indicate there was a basic misunderstanding ~ 
as to what title insurance is and to view the industry's perform- l 
ance on the basis of loss ratio is totally erroneous. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN: I would like an illustration of 
that if possible. 
MR. McCARTHY: As I indicated, one answer is the vast 
differences between the casualty insurance business and the title 
insurance business . The fundamental difference is in the expec-
tations of consumers when they purchase the policy of title insur-
ance as opposed to the policy of casualty insuranceo 
The horne buyer expects and receives assurances that 
upon assuming title to real property the rights of his predecessors 
in ownership and all other persons or public agencies having an 
interest in that property are exactly as reported to him by a 
title entity, and if correctly reported, he can rely on the finan-
cial integrity of his insurer to defend against subsequent attacks 
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ang to compensate him for any losses he might suffer. This is not 
1., - - ·- · ~ • ' ... - ' 
the case with casualty insurance. 
------.. ·--~-~ ... ~ -··- -·- ..... . .. . - . ' 
The title insurance is unique and differs markedly 
from casualty insurance. Title insurance offers protection for 
events which have occurred in the past. casualty insurance, on 
the other hand, undertakes to indemnify against damage or loss in 
the event of a future occurrenceo Stated differently, casualty 
insurance is basically a process of risk assumption, while title 
insurance is basically an informational process resulting in risk 
elimination. Title insurance is a single premium insurance . The 
same is not true for casualty insurance. Under a title policy, 
the insured owner is indemnified against damage or loss during his 
entire period of ownership whether it be five years, or 25 years, 
or 50 years. In the event of death, his heirs continue to be 
~~ot~cted under the terms of the policy. The key distinction, 
however, to be drawn between title and casualty insurance lies in 
the vast differences in the costs associated with the production 
of a policy of title insurance and a policy of casualty insurance. 
It is estimated that fully 80% of premium income of a title insurer 
is expended in salaries and in direct support of the large numbers 
of highly trained personnel and equipment which must be maintained 
-.... ... . - ..... ···- -. .. 
as a condition of engaging in the title business. The reason for 
this high ratio of production costs to income can only be understood 
1 when one has an understanding of the myriad sources of information 
\ which must be consulted prior to being able to properly determine 
to a particular piece of real property is in a ·whether title 
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condition which will allow it to be transferred. And, without such 
understanding, one could easily be led to believe that, indeed, 
title to real property can be transferred as inexpensively and 
expeditiously as title to an automobile. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN: Mr. McCarthy, when title to the 
property as evidenced by title insurance is proper and valid up to 
the point that purchaser buys it, that has already been done for 
the last purchaser, and ••• 
MR. McCARTHY: That's correct~ if you're dealing with 
'---- ··- ·-- -- . .. -~ - --
the same title company • 
.____ .,... ....... ·-
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN: O.K. So really what you're doing 
is certifying -- you're still going back and certifying the title 
back to the very beginning, to the original land grant, or whatever 
it might be. However, in some of the midwestern states where they 
have abstracts of title, the permanent records were established 
each time then when the property exchanged hands, it was simply a 
matter of going back and pulling out the microfilm of the preced-
ing records, automated, and everything that had to be checked 
basically was that simple mechanical operation of bringing it up 
to date from the last sales transaction to the presento 
MR. McCARTHY: That's my understanding. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN: Is there any possible way that 
our system could be made more efficient? 
MR. McCARTHY: Hopefully, the title industry is in 
that process of trying to maintain an efficient system, before 
the services are needed by the consurnerso Under this abstract 
system that you mentioned •• o 
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ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN: I don't mean that it was efficient, 
incidentally ••• 
MR. McCARTHY: I think it has proved to be fairly in-
efficient for them, and also it does not really meet the demands 
of the State having a high volume of real estate activity; number 
one being the law, which would state that even if this were vital 
information, having an effect on title in that abstract, or in all 
the documents posing the chain of title. If there were incorrect 
interpretations of that information, there still would be no lia-
bility on the part of the abstractor, if an ordinary man, 
of ordinary intelligence, viewing that information would 
make a similar mistake. 
attorney in many areas. 
It's quite similar to the exposure of an 
The point here being that the consumer, 
if this were "a reasonable mistake", would have absolutely no 
protection, nor would he have insurance against the invalidity of 
documents ••• 
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN: There would be a rather rudimentary 
research procedure, however, which could be developed theoretically 
on every piece of property in the State of california, which could 
be microfilmed; be made available somehow, perhaps, on a profession-
al basiso I'm not suggesting state basis --but perhaps kept in a 
state location and made available and that way utilized. We have 
nothing of that kind now? 
MR. McCARTHY: Not to my knowledge. An individual 
might undertake to do his own abstract do his own interpreta-
tion -- but as I will point out later, in the case of an attorney ••• 
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ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN: You made a strong case on the 
accuracy of the interpretation of prior transactions of the deed-
ing of property from one individual to another over the years. 
What percentage of claims do you have? 
.MR. McCARTHY: This is the 5% figure -- that ' s the 
loss paid out- of the revenue. 
··-·· . 
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN: You indicated the 5% revenue and 
the 3%. 
MRo McCARTHY: Yes, this seems to be the industry's 
experience: it's slightly higher, but not much higher. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN: Is that considered to be a very 
low figure by the industry? 
MR. McCARTHY: Virtually any loss is considered to be 
too high by the industry. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN: Is there any way that that rate 
could be brought down? 
MR. McCARTHY: Hopefully, by more efficient record-
keeping systems and better trained personnel. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN: Do you see any way where there 
could be a statewide system of microfilming of property trans-
actions, which would be permanent? 
MR. McCARTHY: I think what we're getting into in this 
area is really a fundamental legislative decision on really a 
cost benefit analysis. Would the costs incident to taking such 
approach being borne by the public, be sufficient to offset the 
advantages that would benefit the public. In a study of the 
Pennsylvania system, and I have to qualify this because I'm not 
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sure of the exact figures, an amount in the area of about $2.1 
billion was estimated as the cost of updating the recordation 
system in that State. In California, the magnitude of such cost 
would be exceedingly greater than that, and this would have to be 
balanced against the costs that consumers are presently paying for 
this service and the information that they are given. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN: All right. Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Mr. Mccarthy, do I understand that 
the title company goes way back to the year one in checking their 
records? How far back do they go? 
MR. McCARTHY: As far back in the chain of title as 
necessary. There are efficiences; I mean, if the title has been 
done then there would be a review of information from that date 
forward, provided you're with that particular title insurer and in 
that instance there are cost reductions available to the consumer. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: O.K. That was going to be my 
!next question. But J! . t~at company has run a title ~earch, their current search would only go back to the time of the last search? •.__- ... 
MRo McCARTHY: ~hat's righto That's on the presumption 
...... ..... .. ... 
that all prior work was correct. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Well, O.Ko, but until you had 
some reason to believe otherwise, there is a cost reduction where 
---~,..·-·-------.--...-
that occurs? 
MR.; McCARTHY: Yes, approximately 20%, if the transfer 
is within two years of the initial sale, and -some insurers provide 
---~-~--:------ --· ....... ---·---·--·- . - -· - - ·- ·--·· --- . ~··...--··-
that reduction for a period of ~~~  seve~_years. I think the 
__ .,. ____ ,,... ... _ .... _. __ --·--- -----·~=-~~ ..._,~- . . ~------· .., ... 
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reason for this will come out in my testimony. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: All right. These other systems 
1\ 
\ 
that you're 
systems? 
talking about -- are these the so-called "Torrens" 
I 
MR. McCARTHY: No, what Assemblyman Ha;td~n. w~s referring 
to is jus~_ .. ~ .:!=orm of title insurance in other states -- the abstract 
....-----·-- - . --··- .. . -
of title approach, the certi·ficate of title approach and the title 
insurance approach, which we would contend would be the most 
efficient for a system having a volume of real estate activity of 
california. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: But doesn't this tie in to the 
so-called Torrens title system? 
MR. McCARTHY: No, it's an enti~ely different processo 
I'm not an expert on the To!.!:~s system, but essentially that 
would .. he a state~operated method, people applying to the Clerk of 
the Tor~~ns Court for a certificate indicating that title is, in 
-. . ..... - .. 
fact, in that personal form of transfer of the property. California 
incidentally operated under that Torrens system, which proved 
extremely inefficient, costly, and did not properly respond to 
the demands of the public, and, I believe in the 1930s the system 
was abandoneda 
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN: I'm still a little bit confused 
on this, Mr. Chairman. I have had some experience here. Years 
ago I made my living by doing title searches, under a completely 
different system, and as I indicated, a rather inefficient system. 
But my job was examining every record that we could find including 
criminal records, guardianship records, every aspect that had 
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influence to the title itself. Don't you have an index that you 
can utilize to eliminate all of these kinds of things? There is 
a large percentage of them. 
MR. McCARTHY: That is exactly what I was going to 
cover in my subsequent testimony. As you are all aware, title 
insurance is concerned with real property: land and things attached 
to it are considered part of land, the minerals beneath and air-
space above the land, numerous incidental rights. In contrast, 
personal property is all other types of property. Items of personal 
property can be readily examined for possible defects, and the 
person in possession is generally presumed to be the owner. Assur-
ances from a third party as to ownership and the quality and 
condition of title are not essential to most transactions involving 
personal property, and in situations where such assurances are 
essential, it is obtained with relative ease. This is simply not 
the case when you're dealing with real propertyo 
When dealing with real property, the common law, 
(\ judicial actions, legislative actions, and a constantly changing 
\body of law in the area of public records combine to form an im-
~ressive hurdle to secure understanding of the condition of title 
\ 
r o a particular piece of property. On analysis, _it is the law of 
~·----~ .. ~-----·-.. 
real property that is at the source of most costs associated with 
• 'fr ..,,.,.,,. t -••-··· ... .-.. • -~- ~~-·-·•-~----~-• .....,. ... ..,_._..,.., ., .. -···--·--··•--..-_._., r-·-.--•••• • ..... .,....._,..., __ •• .---··"''·--~-·••-·- ·~ -. 
what the HUD-VA Report termed title-related costs. It has been 
--······-···-··-.... ---- ·-··· ·---· ' 
pointed out that the title examination and title insurance processes 
are essentially consumer-protection processes caused by the fact 
that our legal system recognizes an amazingly large number of inter-
...... -... ..... -~-· ................ ---·- _,. ___  ----·-- _ ,. ..... - ----··---------- .. -. ---- - -- - ----· --- ····------·--
ests iz:t. ) .. and which affect marketability of title. Aside from the 
., ,____ - .. -· -·--- .. ·- · -· -·--·- . . ... .... - -
- 19 -
observation, it must be recognized that the sources of record 
information having a potential effect on title are many. 
Now, it is absolute myth that a person can accurately 
determine the status of title by a simple analysis of a chain of 
title gleaned from the office of a county recorder. The law today 
provides for numerous public records concerning rights in real 
v v J 
property: records of probate, domestic relations, and civil pro-
/ ,_ , 
ceedings, ~records of judgments, federal, state and local government 
tax liens and special districts having the power to levy taxes or 
' v 
assessments on real property, and records in federal bankruptcy 
proceedings are records generally that must be reviewed and 
analyzed prior to being able to properly determine the status of 
title. In Los Angeles County alone, over one million documents 
are recorded annually and this is but one source of record informa-
tion affecting the status of title. The problem is further com-
pounded by the fact that these record-keeping offices are so frag-
mented and scattered and so inefficiently arranged that the title 
industry has been forced to resort to the construction and main-
tenance of independent title plants as a means of coping with the 
ever-increasing mass of information. 
But whether or not the title industry maintains title 
plants, the fact remains that the processes of determining what is 
recorded against a particular parcel of property and more important-
ly determining the effect of such recording in the final analysis 
is the process which requires time-consuming work and labor of 
people.. ~ title plant simply makes the process more efficient, 
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but a title plant is not a piece of machinery. Building and main-
taining a plant requires people, as does the process of using that 
title plant after it has been built, and so the title industry is 
properly characterized as being labor-intensive, rather than capital·-
---... ~. -- .... .... 
inten~~Y~-~Y~ .~h~ugh s .ubstantial capital is required to enter and _____ ... . 
' ma~~~in_y~yrself in this business. Virtually every person employ-
ed in this industry is in one way or the other performing services 
relating directly or indirectly to the painstaking and time-consuming 
tasks involved in discharging a buyer's and lender's duties of as-
certaining the quality and condition of title to real property. 
Mr. chairman, as you and the members of this Committee 
are aware, our law charges the buyer and the lender with the ulti-
mate responsibility for knowing what has been recorded against 
property. The net effect of recording acts is that buyers and 
lenders are presumed to know all facts regarding all the interests 
disclosed by the record. A title entity merely assumes this re-
sponsibility in ascertaining the condition of the record title and 
further the responsibility for determining the validity and genuine-
ness of the documents in that chain of title. In brief, the insured 
is protected agains~ ··~~~ or damag~) if the search of the title and 
~--....~. ... ·-· '.;;~--- .. 
i~s interpretation were incorrect. Beyond that, the industry in 
.. .............. _ - .. --~ .. ·--·· ,.,~..,~-.-,.._..~ .... ~ 
many instances insures over matters affecting title which, if left 
unresolved, would require the buyer and lender to engage in costly 
and time-consuming legal actions to perfect title. And so, even 
accepting the basic premise of the two critics of the industry 
referred to earlier, their conclusions are falseo Assuming for the 
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moment that the industry's losses are 3%, the remaining 97% is not 
a ripoff. And even if title to real estate can be transferred in 
15 minutes, there are literally hours of behind-the-scenes time 
expended to enable a title entity to determine whether or not title 
is ready to be transferred. Implicit in the 97% argument is the 
assumption that the title entities either do not employ large 
numbers of highly-trained people, or even worse those that are 
employed are not compensated. In norma! __ y~ars, fully 50% of the 
-~---~ • 04- ··- , ••• 
industry's expenses go into direct payroll and employee ben~fit 
-- -- -----......... 
' ·~ ·-··- - -·-·- -----plans. Most of the remaining expenses are in support of that basic 
- .... ··-- ---
-peop~~ cost: to provide workers with places to _work and the nee-
...... -. ... 
essary tools of their tradeo Title plants are but one such tool, 
and the high _ ?os~ of building and upkeep of a title plab~·merely 
makes much more efficient what would otherwise be a far more 
costly and time-consuming personal search of public records. It 
is absolutely essential that a plant be kept current on a daily 
basis. It is only by this method that our industry can properly 
discharge its obligations to its consumers. It is not difficult 
to comprehend the labor and labor-related costs associated with 
transferring into a useable format, information contained in over 
one million documents recorded annually in this County or for 
that matter any county in this Stateo Nor should it be difficult 
to understand the magnitude of these same costs incurred when 
these same documents are later examined to determine whether or not 
they affect ownership rights to a particular piece of real prop-
erty. Stated broadly, the fact is that it is only by incurring 
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these costs that the title industry is in a position to inform its 
consumers of the exact status of titleo It is the maintenance and 
the providing of this information which in the vast number of cases 
enable buyers and lenders to secure possession and title to their 
homes in a secure manner. 
So, one other answer to the critic who referred to the 
industry's low loss ratio of 3% might have been that the industry 
strives for a zero loss ration. The answer would not be altogether 
facetious if one really understands the title industry. On the 
other hand, the answer would not be accurate because the industry 
knows there will be losses on matters that are not disclosed by 
any search of the public records, however careful and painstaking 
that search may beo These are losses insured against in the policy, 
which arise out of off record risks, such as ~~rgeri~s or incompe-
tencies. Generally speaking, as you are aware, recording acts are 
construed to relate only to valid instruments. They afford abso-
lutely no protection when the estate or the interest dealth with 
is invalido This is so even though the parties are unaware of the 
invalidity, the title industry suffers losses from these types of 
risks every day. 
Another answer to the same critic lies in the fact that 
I the conduct of a title industry is truly a high-risk business venture, not as was explained earlier in the sense of insurance risk assumption, but in the sense of potential return on invested 
, .- - • ·-· --• • -- - - • -u - · -• -- •·---• •· -
capital . The existence of this high-risk element is inherent in .... _._._ 
the fact that the demand for the title industry's products and 
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services is a secondary demand, utterly and totally dependent upon 
the primary demand for real estate and real estate loanso It is 
well known that this primary demand for housing and loan funds is 
subject to radical cyclical movement. This fact and the fact that 
the title industry is highly labor-intensive and has a high ratio 
of fixed costs to variable costs, combine to make the industry•s 
revenues and profits highly volatile. 
Now normally where an industry is subject to these 
volatile cyclical variations in its revenues and profits, capital 
investors ordinarily are able to demand and receive a higher return 
on their investment than in an industry that is not subject to such 
cyclical variations. This is not true for the title insurers in 
this State. 
An analysis of the Form 9 Annual Reports of all title 
insurers admitted to do business in California, serves to illustrate 
both the cyclical nature of demand for the industry•s services and 
the fact that the industry return on capital, while highly volatile, 
is not excessiveo 
Focusing on the five-year business cycle ending in 
1973 and commencing with 1969, the data shows that the five-year 
average after-tax rate of return on capital for all admitted 
. -··- --···· ... - . . ~-
Cali~ia title insurers ~}-43%. Within this cycle, the same 
--- -- - -------........ ___..-: 
rate of return ranged from a low of 2.8% in 1969 , the year of low 
real estate volume, to a high of 11.55% in 1972, a period of high 
real estate activity. It is important to note that if this five-
year cycle has moved up one year, that is to include the years 
1970-74, it is projected that the average after-tax rate of return 
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on capital for California insurers will be less than the 7.43% 
average for the 1969-73 period. This fact points up well the 
necessity for viewing the profitability of industries, such as 
ours, on a cyclical, rather than an annual basis if you desire to 
obtain a true picture of the overall profitability of the industry. 
By way of rough comparison, the 7.43% after-tax rate of return on 
capital realized by california i~-~-~;§l_~ __ Q:V§l.~ .. ~pj.._s_ ~~y.e-year period 
.. -- .. . . . - ·-
w~~k i~th~-~~==-~-.9.£ 87_.!:.~.~2:~~.~~-~ composed of 858 ~~- (J. 
panies which comprise the Standard and Poor • s--cornpu'ftfai:---·a.1:U1Uai 
industrial tape. For these 87 industries, the median after-tax 
---··--····-·-·-.... ---~ . 
rate of return on capital for the period of 1960-1969 was 10o25%, 
with 85% of the industries studied having a rate of return in 
excess of 8%. This information strongly suggests that the industry•s 
profits can hardly be termed excessive. 
From time to time it is said that since the title 
findustry•s charges are based on the monetary size of a transaction, 
' 
the industry must be profiting from inflation at the expense of 
/the consumer. Theoretically, given the present rate structure for 
title insurance, if the general rate of inflation is 10%, for 
example, a title cornpany•s revenues would increase by only 5%. 
At the same time, its costs, which as you will recall are largely 
people-related costs, would increase at the same 1~/o level. Appli-
cation of this theory by one member of our industry resulted in 
the following: From the close of 1970 to May of 1974, the horne 
ownership cost index for Los Angeles showed an increase of 19%, 
while the building cost index for the same area increased by 23o8%. 
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Application of an average 20% increase to the sales price of a 
horne which sold in 1971 for $30,000 and comparing the cost of 
title insurance at the original $30,000 and at the inflated $36,000 
figure, resulted in an increase of revenues to the title insurers 
of 10.3%. Over the same period of time, the average salary paid 
by this insurer to its almost 6,000 employees rose by 23o3%. The 
result is that inflation has reduced this insurer's profits, and 
this experience is typical of the entire california title industry. 
And while there have been numerous filings with the Insurance De-
- ----------- ------- -- - ------- -· ------- ---
partrnent_t,g increase rat~..a -Gver thi-s · pexJQ.d, the operation of 
--------------------------- ----
market forces has compelled the abandonment of these attempts by 
industry members simply in order to stay conpetitive and avoid 
substantial losses of business. Stated differently, in the absence 
of a price increase and with runaway inflation having increased 
both the price of real estate and most of the title industry's costs, 
the price of title insurance to the consumer in real dollars has 
decreased markedly over the past four years. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: As I understand it, when the 
price goes up, your rates go down. 
MR. McCARTHY: The rate of increase is not on a one-
for-one basis, as it is with many related costso It approximates 
one-half of the rate of inflation; it's what the data would indicate . 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: The larger the deal, the 
money involved, the lower proportionately your rate is. 
MR. McCARTHY: That's one factor, yes. 
From our earlier comments, it should be evident that 
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the title industry has always been concerned with the inefficient 
and costly public record-keeping systems, which are known today in 
California and elsewhere. That concern continues today, and the 
title industry in California continues to seek still more efficient 
ways in which to discharge the buyer's and the lender's responsibil-
ities to make sure that their title is goodo Thus, for example, 
refinements are being made every day in the industry's procedures 
and methods. Beyond that, many mernb~_§-o:t the -~-Il<Ju~:J:.EU~~j.c~~te 
---~---·.-"' 
in so-called joint title plants in order to ~ead the cost among 
---=-------=-----------,.----.,,..,..- -·-----..... ..,..- ..... ._e----...,~-·- ..-
two or more title companies and to hold the line on expenses. 
Computerization is ~ng __ ;:~.§.Q;:,ted to in functions that are adapt-
.--- ---- . ·-····-···-H" ......... _ ... __,., ..... _.~ ..... ~-·~-.. .. "'~---..----·-------........ ____ .......... .,_. ·-··-
able to that approacho And the industry supports those proposals 
------..------~·--···-
in pending federal legislation which would direct the Secretary of 
Housing and Urban Development to establish and place in operation 
on a demonstration basis in various areas of the United States, one 
or more model systems for more efficient and simpler maintenance . of 
public land records. We view such efforts as but one further step 
in the long history of innovative efforts to provide an efficient, 
accurate and speedy method of delivering vital information to 
persons dealing with real property. The need for this service has 
existed under our common law heritage since well before the year 
1200 and continues today. The relative short history of California 
has seen the abstract of title give way t~ a certificate of title 
which eventually gave way to title insurance -- such changes being 
in direct response to the rapid social and economic growth coupled 
with a demand for financial responsibility in the event of error. 
While many of these earlier practices are still the norm in other 
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states, their application to California is no longer economically 
feasible. 
The title industry welcomes constructive advances in 
the field of public land records, and we are confident that any 
efforts at such improvement will serve to point out the extent to 
which this industry has contributed to the public welfare. One 
need only picture a system without the title industry's contribution 
in order to understand this point. Visualize, if you will, each 
of the approximate 20,000 real estate transactions in Los Angeles 
county in a typical month requiring a personal search of the public 
records by the buyer, by the lender, or by their representatives. 
Picture each of those transactions also requiring a 
separate filing for record of documents affecting title, with none 
of the efficiencies which are present when the title entities group 
all their transactions into a single filing for the convenience of 
the county recorder. Without the title industry's contributions 
to the system, literally hundreds of thousands of additional dollars 
would be required to provide additional space, additional equipment 
and additional government employees needed to serve the public. 
Admittedly, Los Angeles is an extreme example, but the 
point is valid for most california counties. All this additional 
cost would have to be borne by the public, either in higher taxes 
or by way of increased charges to the users of the system. 
Mr. chairman and members of the Committee, the california 
land title industry, as represented by the CLTA, believes it has, 
over the years, made a very important contribution to the economic 
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and social growth of this State. Its products and services are 
needed by the construction industry, the real estate industry, the 
lending industry, and most of all by the consumers. In a very real 
sense, the rapid and efficient transfer and encumbrance of real 
property which are at the heart of california's growth would not 
have been possible without the important contribution of the title 
industry. In comparison with the other components in the staggering 
array of services which together make up settlement costs, the amount 
that the title industry receives for its important contribution to 
horne ownership and real property financing and to the past and 
future economic well-being of this State is modest indeed. 
Speaking for the California Land Title Association, I 
wish to thank you and the members of the Committee for this oppor-
tunity to put into proper perspective the title industry's role in 
the settlement process. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Mr. McCarthy, on what grounds or 
on what basis does the industry establish their premiums? 
MRo McCARTHY: I'm not an expert. The Association, as 
such, is expressly precluded by statute from involving itself in 
rates. However, I could conjecture that the rates are established 
on the basis of historical costs associated with personnel, equip-
ment, maintenance of title plants, and projections on the possible 
loss factor that may result from transactions in any given yearo 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Your loss factor would have to be 
a minor element, since your losses are so lowo 
MR. McCARTHY: I agree, but the exposures are nonetheless 
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there and ·.:hare • s a great de=-~- ')f. c~r..cern over a mistake or some-
thing that . c~uld turn a $ 1.65 transaction to a $3 0 or $40, 000 loss o 
:HAIRMAN Mc~~ISTER: All right; thank you. We welcome 
Assemblyman Knox, who joined us a few minutes ago . Th~nk you, 
Mr. McCarthy_ Next we have Mr. Steve Baker of the Department of 
Consumer Affairso 
lV.IR. STEVE BAKER: Mr. Chairman and Members, the State 
Department of Consumer Affairs welcomes these hearings, as an in-
formationa l so·c.rce. It is also an important opportunity to express 
our conviction that consumers must be placed in a more equitable 
position in relation to the financial institutions involved with 
real property f~nancing. 
These hearings have been scheduled during a period 
which is common knowledge to all: the housing industry is experi-
encing the brunt of our economic difficultieso Housing starts are 
down; interest rates are higho The consumer's need for housing 
remains stronger than ever, and the industry's or market's response 
is weak. In short, the industry would appear to be depressed; 
these are inflationary times. It's unfortunately true, however, 
that at the same time the average American family, particularly in 
the last four years, cannot afford the average American new horne; 
and as the consurr;er needs this industry, the industry obviously 
needs the consumer. It is a two-way street. 
I should emphasize at this point that we're not going 
to be talking to all of the possible points that might be contained 
in these hearings, but what we are about to propose, I think will 
speak to many of them. 
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In our investigation of consumer problems associated 
with real property financing, such problem areas as late payment 
charge~, prep~e~_J?enalties, acceleration c~~~~es, or due-on-sale 
-----· ··-... _.._.. . - .. . --·-··------- -··-···-···-------------------·---._ ---
cl~ses~ and non-payment of interest on impound accounts associated 
----- -.. .... _ .. __ --...... ---·-·-- ----- .. -- _ __. .. -... ---......... ----··- . - . -.... -. 
wi~~~~~~ loans, we came again and again to a recurring ques-
--- ---·--
....... ._ ··- --- .. . . ... - -... ·-· .. ·- ····-·· ·-- --- -·· 
tLon: ·~at are the real costs associated with a savings and loan 
--------------·-·· ·--· ·· .... - ...... _ 
----------·---------.. - ·----
And what relationship exists or a _ba~_lo.~p._._service department? 
.. ..._ .. , _____ ., ____ ' ' ·- .. ..... . - .. ... .. 
between such costs and the fees and penalties charged consumers 
purportedly to cover these costs?" And the recurring need arose 
for a cost analysis of these loan service departments at banks and 
savings and loan associations in order to determine these actual 
administrative costs. 
And the administrative costs of which we speak are 
those costs associated primarily with the imposition of late pay-
ment charges, such as actual bookkeeping and billing expenses as 
well as the loss of interest incurred by the lending institution-: 
the administrative costs connected with the imposition of a pre-
payment penalty and how much real income is actually foregone by 
a lending institution because of a prepayment: how much has it 
really cost a lender when one loan is closed and another extended? 
What actual cost does a lender experience or incur when an already 
existing loan is assumed by a third party? And just what are the 
real costs to a lending institution that would justify the imposi-
tion of an acceleration clause and cause a refinancing of an 
already existing loan at a much higher rate of interest? What 
maintenance costs are related to impound accounts for property 
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insurance and taxes that justify not one penny of interest being 
paid on these oftentimes substantial amounts, and how do these 
costs compare with the millions of dollars that consumers in this 
State lose every year due to this non-payment of interesto 
Almost invariably the defense or one of the primary 
defenses made for these various fees, aside from their punitive 
impact, is administrative cost. What are these administrative 
costs, and what relationship do they bear to fees and penalties 
imposed? 
Let us examine, for example, late payment penalties. 
The average banking institution in th~ State is currently assess-
ing late payment penalties in the amount of 4 or 5% of the monthly 
installment due. The average savings and loan association is 
assessing somewhat less than 10% of the installment dueo The 
average savings and loan association is assessing its amount at 
the same time the banks are assessing a substantially less amount. 
Yet we can look to the Veterans Administration where 4% of the 
monthly installment due is levied; to the FHA where 2% is assessed. 
The State Superintendent of Banking in New York proposed 2% as a 
penalty claiming, and I quote: 11This figure is more than sufficient 
to cover a few days of extra interest and any computer printed 
late notices." The 2% figure was passed, and is now law in the 
State of New York. As the Superintendent of Banking in New York 
has stated, and I quote once again, 11 The threat of foreclosure was 
a more effective. impetus to prompt payment than highly profitable 
late payment operations." 
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In two comparatively recent court cases (Clermont vs. 
Secured Investment Corp. and Garrett vs. coast & Southern Federal 
Savings and Loan), it was the opinion of the court in each case 
that late payment penalties must reflect actual damages and that 
the late payment penalty must bear a reasonable relationship to 
probable loss incurred by the lender . It is in the light of such 
decisions, as well as the institutional rates I mentioned before 
in a brief comparison, that we do not believe a 10% figure, for 
example, on a late payment penalty figure is a responsible figure. 
We are, however, left with a problem, and it's very real. It's 
not just our problem alone. How does a consumer, or even a court, 
determine what constitutes 11 a reasonable relationship to probable 
loss" without knowing what costs are incurred by lenders? A 
standard cost must be determined in order to have a basis of corn-
parison between actual damages incurred and fees addressed consumers. 
It is important to note that those extending mortgages 
are already the most advantaged creditors aroundo Borrowers in 
the form of homeowners are less likely to be late or default on 
their obligations than are other debtors. If they do have finan-
cial problems, they will most likely defer payment or default on 
less dear possessions than their homes. The security for the 
------~ 
------.-..... __ .. _ ..-
lender is almost always more than the out~.t-~nding debto Retailers 
,_.. ---------------~- ---·----·· ~_ ....... -~-- ~-···· .. ......... --...... _., ....... .., . .- ... - ....... ·-~ _,. 
in this State have little or no security and yet are limited to 
5% of the installment due for delinquency. Those who make auto-
mobile loans have little security and experience great risk and 
difficulty in repossession and yet are limited to 5% of the 
- 33 -
installment due through provisions of the Rees-Levering Act. 
These figures were established in the absence of case law indicat-
ing that fees should bear a reasonable relationship to liquidated 
damages. In light of the legal admonition in the Garrett case 
alone, I think that the need for an accounting of the costs asso-
ciated with the imposition of late fees becomes all the more ap-
parent and necessary. 
How do real costs relate to fees charged? It would 
appear that late payment penalties should compensate lenders only 
for actual losses of interest and for the cost of processing de-
layed payments and reminder noticeso This amount seems to provide 
an adequate incentive for timely payment in the examples to which 
I previously referred: FHA, or VA, or the state banks of New York; 
but we need to know base costs. 
In the example of prepayment penalties, or as it else-
where is referred to as prepayment charges, it is worthwhile to 
note that such charges were originated to protect lenders against 
declining interest rates. Mortgagors were to be dissuaded from 
refinancing their loans simply because a lower rate of interest 
was available elsewhere. But prepayment penalties have stayed 
with us even during the latest period of steeply rising interest 
rates. Only the rationale for their existence has changed. 
Current justifications for prepayment penalties center 
about, first, providing the lender with stable income over a period 
of time and, second, covering administrative costs involved with 
closing out the old loan and financing another borrower . 
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But what costs are we talking about? The average life 
.. .._ ~- .. ~·.,. ... ---· ·-~ .............. , 
of a mo~n is ~I?EOX~EJ.2.:':.~2-~.-§.§l.Y~..n...y..e.ars _J.n .. :t;..h~.~ ... ~:t,.~~.=.~ In 
Southern California, the life of a mortgage loan averages less 
than five years . The penalty generally assessed a consumer, if 
he or she can pay more than 20% of the loan amount in any one year, 
is a standard six months interesto Thus we are faced with the 
spectre of prepayment penalties being assessed in substantial amounts 
on the average mortgage loan . 
It is at such a juncture that we need to ask ourselves 
if the present period of time in which a prepayment penalty is 
assessed, perhaps 5 to 7 years, is justified due to cost . We need 
to ask ourselves what would happen if the cutoff point after which 
no prepayment penalty were assessed, or could be assessed, were 
lowered to five, four, or even three years. Indeed, we should know 
the hard cost data that justifies the imposition of a prepayment 
penalty at all during a period of steeply rising interest rates, . 
such as the kind we're currently experiencing. 
The lending institutions' concern at not receiving 
full interest if the borrower prepays does not appear to be valid 
at all. An institution can reloan or invest the money prepaid al-
most immediately without suffering a loss . What the lender might 
lose because of a prepayment is easily recouped by finance charges 
or closing costs as well as a still higher rate of interest. In 
fact, today, rising interest rates almost assure the lender of an 
even greater return on his money should it be necessary to find 
a new borrower. 
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We have to ask ourselves the hard questions: Do pur-
ported costs to lenders justify the current period of time during 
which prepayment penalties are assessed? Are prepayment penalties 
justified at all in periods of rising interest rates? 
Indeed, today, a lending institution may assess a 
penalty and demand that the entire existing loan be paid off at 
the time of sale. The "due on sale" provisions in mortgage loan 
contracts are otherwise known as acceleration charges or acceler-
ation clauses. These clauses accelerate the point in time at which 
a loan is due. Consequently, consumers may be charged a prepayment 
penalty as well as be required to pay off their already existing 
loan. It is claimed that prepayment penalties cover costs and 
prqvide stable income for lenders. But is it not true that lenders 
more than recoup any losses when they accelerate a prior loan and 
refinance a new loan at a higher interest rate? 
Again, we need to know just what costs need to be 
covered, and in what amounts they need to be covered before we can 
prescribe an amount by which prepayment penalties should be lowered. 
But more importantly, the hard cost data associated with closing 
an old loan and administering a new loan must be determined to 
justify the very imposition of a prepayment penalty. We need a 
standard against which to determine when penalties are cost-justified 
and when penalties are assessed for pure profit. 
There are indeed a number of legitimate consumer con-
cerns with real property financingo Aside from prepayment penalties, 
late payment penalties, acceleration clauses, and a host of others, 
there remains the problem of non-payment of interest on impound 
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accounts. The impound accounts to which we refer are the accounts 
which are established when a mortgage loan is extendedo Mortgagors 
pay into these trust accounts for the purpose of insuring that 
property taxes and insurance are paid in a timely fashion. It is 
our understanding that with the passage of AB 1514 and Senate Bill 
1748, the consumer's decision as to whether or not to enter into 
an impound account arragement was to be made voluntary and that he 
was to be informed of the unavailability of interest. But should 
that consumer still decide to enter into the impound account ar-
rangement was to be made voluntary and that he was to be informed 
of the unavailability of interesto But should that consumer still 
decide to enter into the impound account arrangement, no interest 
is payable on the oftentimes substantial monies involved. Lenders 
claim that no interest is paid because of the maintenance costs 
associated with these impound accounts. There are a substantial 
number of these accounts presently; accounts bearing no interest. 
The cost study which we advocate would determine the 
validity of the claim that no interest is paid because of the 
cost of administering these accounts is so much. Again, we must 
ask ourselves a basic question: 11 How does the cost of maintaining 
an impound account compare to the millions of dollars lost by con-
sumers every year because no interest is paid on them? Are lend-
ing institutions actually profiting by the use of monies contained 
in these accounts more than they are suffering in administrative 
costs? 11 
Should we make absolute recommendations, we fully 
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realize that you would request, or hope you would request, hard 
cost data. We are, as you have no doubt observed, in the very 
uncomfortable position of saying a 10% charge on a late installment 
due is too high; even 6% seems too high. Prepayment penalties 
appear to be excessive, particularly when interest rates are rising. 
It appears that interest rates should be offered on impound accounts. 
But intuition, the experience of other lending institutions and the 
conduct of other states takes us only so far. Whether we concern 
ourselves with the specific penalties and fees I have mentioned, or 
seek to explore still others, central to the justifications for 
these various penalties and fees is the repeated claim that they 
are needed to cover costs. Central to our consideration of these 
various penalties, or indeed central to any rational and complete 
analysis, is the need to determine just what these costs are by 
asking the question: "What is the cost of a savings and loan or 
bank loan service function?" Only by determining how fees charged 
relate to real costs incurred will we be able to judge the validity 
of claims which hold that all is justified due to cost. It is a 
fundamental necessity that a standard of cost be determined and 
made available. 
In order for the recommended study to be impartial and 
unbiased, in order for this analysis to be meaningful and at all 
forthright, it is of paramount importance that it be undertaken by 
an impartial and independent entity. 
We find it difficult to believe to say the least that 
banks and savings and loan associations are not sufficiently aware 
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of their own costs associated with the imposition of late payment 
penalties, or prepayment penalties, loan assumptions, impound 
accounts, et cetera, to provide us with figures, and yet they are 
somehow magically able to determine the size and duration of pen-
alties assessed consumers. 
In essence, Mr. chairman and Members, we need an im-
partial and unbiased assessment of the costs actually incurred by 
a loan service department or function, as a basis against which 
to measure the validity or reasonableness of fees charged consumersa 
It is our strong recommendation that the need for such 
a study be recognized as fundamental, and that the study be under-
taken in order to determine fact. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Thank you, Mr. Baker. Let me 
welcome Assemblyman Mike Cullen to our gathering today. Mr. 
Hayden has a question. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN: Mr. Baker, do you have specific . 
recommendations as to who should be involved or who should be 
charged with the making of this study? Are you, for example, 
suggesting that the State Legislature mandate the State Department 
of Consumer Affairs to make such a study, or that some other ad-
ministrative department of state government make it and that in-
formation come back to the Legislature? 
MRo BAKER: Well, I think, with reference to the state 
Department of Consumer Affairs conducting it, as far as its ability 
presently to conduct it, it's more or less a baby department. The 
funding is smallo What we had in mind was an independent or im-
partial entity away from some state departments, perhaps certain 
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consulting firms. We didn't want to get into the mechanisms of it, 
but if you wanted a suggestion, we would suggest the Legislative 
Analyst's office, or the Auditor General. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN: You're suggesting an independent 
legislative study, rather than one which would involve the savings 
and loan department, or the state banking department? 
MR. BAKER: I'm not really aware of the abilities of 
either one of those two departments to naturally undertake the 
study. Let's say they were. I think that we would still urge that 
it be more of an independent entity than those that you just men-
tioned. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN: They are regulatory agencies in a 
sense rather than investigative. Is it your impression that the 
costs of administration are far ~ower than the amount of benefit 
gained by the savings and loans, banks, and so forth, than on im-
pound accounts? 
MR. BAKER: With reference to impound accounts? 
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN: Yes, the amount of monies paid 
into those and then utilized. 
MR. BAKER: Well, as I am sure each and everyone of 
you is aware, and all the people in the audience are aware, any 
mortgage loan is a substantial amount of money~ any impound ac-
count connected with that loan is oftentimes a very substantial 
amount of money~ and even though a borrower can enter into an im-
pound account in full knowledge that no interest will be paid on 
that account, the fact remains that no interest is borne by the 
account, and we believe that represents literally millions of 
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dollars lost to California consumers for an unsubstantiated and an 
unjustified reason: namely, costs associated with maintenance of 
those accounts. We haven't seen a study done: we are not aware of 
the actual costs associated with them, but we strongly suspect that 
they aren't anywhere near those millions of dollars which are lost 
to consumers every year. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN: But they might be similar in cost 
to my own savings account. 
MR. BAKER: Somewhat similar, but impound accounts are 
somewhat different. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN: Administrative cost wise? Are 
they different? 
MR. BAKER: Well, there may be a case made for even 
0 more transactions, I'm not sure. You know, you pay into the im-
pound account annually, or semi-annually. Paid out of that account 
are property taxes, property insurance premiums, and we just don't 
see a high maintenance cost associated with those accounts enough 
to justify no interest being paid on them whatsoever. We need to 
determine this as fact. 
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: You know, we've been hearing about 
these impound accounts and prepayment penalties for years . I am 
curious about the sudden interest of the Department of Consumer 
Affairs. How long have you been a member of that Department? 
MR. BAKER: I have been a member of that Department 
for four months. 
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: Four months? I note you are a 
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Staff Analyst. How many staff Analysts are there in the Department? 
MR. BAKER: We have a grand total of three. 
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: Three? And that covers the entire 
spectrum of all activities from groceries, to automobiles, to 
television sets, to anything that you want to name. 
MR. BAKER: A more accurate description would be 
understaffed a 
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: Well, I realize, of course, there's 
a change in the administration corning up, and it may well be some 
changes in the function of the various departments when the Governor 
takes over. But I'm just curious that your primary recommendation 
here is that there be an independent study of the issues. Are you 
familiar with any of the studies that have been made over the years 
by the Legislature, the Superintendent of Banks, and by various 
other functionaries of state government? 
MR. BAKER: We're not familiar with any study that has 
been accomplished by anybody that gets into actual context with 
what administrative costs are for the banks and savings and loan 
associations. 
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: You have formed a flat conclusion 
that administrative costs per se, that is the cost of clerical work, 
the cost of supervising the clerical work. Are they only defen-
sible costs? 
MR. BAKER: No. Definitely not; they're punitive 
measures. For example, with their late payment penalties.a. 
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: Punitive measures? 
MR. BAKER: Well, measures thato •• 
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ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: The borrower would be punished for 
making payments late. Hopefully, that will correct him to do 
right in the futureo 
MR. BAKER: Right. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Any other questions or comments? 
Thank you, Mr. Baker. 
MR. BAKER: Thank you very much. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: We will break for lunch and come 
back at one o'clock. 
RECESS 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: The meeting of the Committee will 
come to order again. Since this morning, we have been joined by 
Assemblyman Mobley from the Fresno areao 
Our next witness will be Commissioner Gleeson L. Payne 
of the Department of Insurance. You have brought with you 
Mr. Lawrence c. Baker, your Chief Deputy. 
MR. GLEESON L. PAYNE: Yes, sir, I did. 
Mr. Chairman, we appreciate the opportunity of appear-
ing before your committee. I am in my last few days of my career 
as a bureaucrat, but I would like to state that I came here partic-
ularly to pay tribute to the way in which you carry on your Com-
mittee and the integrity with which you go about your obligations 
and duties. I have, as you mentioned, with me Chief Deputy 
Lawrence Baker, whom I would like to have bring you up to date on 
the activities of the Insurance Department, and what we have been 
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doing in addressing ourselves to the subject of title insurance in 
the State of californiao 
MR. LAWRENCE C. BAKER, JR. : Mro Chairman, my name is 
Lawrence c. Baker, Jr.; I am chief Deputy Insurance Commissioner. 
It is a pleasure to be here this afternoon and to address your 
Committee, and we appreciate the opportunity to give the Committee 
our views of the title insurance industry and how it fits into the 
overall picture of the closing and settlement costs that are part 
of ~he real estate transaction. 
I was not here this morning but I can see from the 
chart on the pedestal that there has been some discussion of just 
what part the title insurance industry plays in the overall settle-
ment costs, and it is our observation that they are relatively a 
small part but I don't think that in any way diminishes the neces-
sity to examine title insurance, as it relates to the real estate 
industry because every component that goes into closing costs is 
contributing to the ability of purchasers of real property to be 
able to afford the purchase. This is particularly true in today's 
environment where real estate values are going up very rapidly and, 
generally speaking, title insurance costs along with other types 
of costs go up right along with the increase in value. The costs 
of title insurance are generally computed in relation to the amount 
of the transaction involved. 
Title insurance in our observation, at least in our 
studies of this business in the past few years, must first be 
recognized in its relationship to the overall real estate trans-
action in -the mechanism of just exactly how it works and how i~ 
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then use a subsidiary organization of some kind to refurbish the 
real estate. They then put the real estate onto the market through 
their subsidiary that acts as a real estate broker. When the sale 
is made, they handle the escrow in their own escrow company and 
they might perhaps have a title insurance company to handle the 
title insurance, and they might have a savings and loan subsidiary 
to handle the loan: the whole thing being done within one financial 
conglomerate and offering a package of services to the person 
participating in the real estate transaction. 
Now, the thing that the buyer or seller of real estate 
is going to focus on is, of course, the real estate itself. The 
other things that go with that real estate are very much secondary 
considerations, and I think probably in the case of title insurance 
that there practically is no focus at all on the part of the pur-
chaser or seller of the real estate, as to the cost certainly of 
title insurance, or even who they're purchasing it from. 
Not too long ago I purchased a horne myself, and I ask-
ed the title insurance from one carrier, and the escrow company 
told me that you just can't get it from that guy; you have to take 
it from the one we give it too And I asked for the escrow to be 
handled in a bank, and they said, "No, you have to have it in this 
escrow company." And that was when a real estate broker was in-
volved, so like the normal purchaser I simply succumbed to the 
desires of the real estate broker as to how that thing was handled. 
I really didn't know what the cost of any of these elements was 
going to b~ un~il the closing and they gave me a statement and 
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said, here's what you pay. So you really don't have any opportunity 
to bring the normal open market forces to bear on title insurance 
costs, or escrow costs. You pretty much take it the way the real 
estate broker hands it to you. If the real estate broker is doing 
his job, he will, of course, see that title insurance, the organi-
zation that handles the escrow, all of the other elements involved 
in closing real estate transactions are at the lowest possible 
cost in order to benefit his principal. 
But, over the past few years as I say, the tendency 
to develop combinations of entities handling the real estate trans-
action has been increasingo At the same time within the title 
insurance industry, the extent of dominance by a single title 
insurer has been gradually diminishing. Where now we find the 
largest title insurer in the State in 1973 had 44¥/o of the market, 
that is down about five points from what they had two years earlier. 
But, at one time, I believe the percentage of the market that the 
title insurer had approached 75%. Now, in addition to the market 
being dominated less by a single title insurer, there have been 
new title insurers commencing operations both through original 
formations of companies and through foreign companies entering this 
jurisdiction. We have now about 19 title insurers that are licensed 
to do business in california, and we have observed over the past 
two or three years that there is active competition among those 
title insurers, but their competition until just lately has not 
focused very much on the purchaser or seller of real estate; rather 
it has focused on those individuals who direct these sales to the 
particular title insurer. In that connection, we became aware a 
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couple of years ago of considerable ac~!y~_'!;.y __ l:!! ways to rebate a 
--.. :·~---··--........ -·--· -···-..... ... .. -. ~ -- --·· ._ .... - ·-
part of the fees•"'-of the tit±e--i -ns.ur.st+. ..... :f::.o the real estate bro~;:ers 
principally, but a~~o o!he~ ~~t~t~es that control or direct the 
sales of title insurance. We began an investigation into the ex-
tent of these rebate activities and became convinced that there 
were serious abuses developing and, of course, this adds to the 
cost of the title insurance. Our first reaction was that we would 
immediately go out and investigate and find the extent of rebating, 
and find the insurers that were participating. But we found just 
about all of them were doing it to one degree or another, and the 
investigation and extent of fines was so massive as to make it 
probably a practical impossibility to really carry it out. 
So, as an alternate, before really making an intensive 
investigation into the actual dollar amount of rebating, we tried 
to determine with the assistance of the title insurance industry, 
which was cooperative in this endeavor, the types of activity that 
were involved in rebating. We then issued a bulletin early this 
year which gave a very strong enforcement posture on our part and 
enumerated those types of activities, which we deemed to be un-
lawful. Now, there has been practically none of the direct dollar 
under-the-table rebating to our observation where a title insurer 
would give back so many dollars for referring a title insura~ce 
order. But the forms of rebating consisted principally of various 
kinds of favors that were bestowed upon the people who referred 
title insurance business. This took the form of free services, of 
compensating bank balances deposited in consideration of them 
getting a loan from a bank, o-£ lavish entertainment; , er purchasing 
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advertising in a house organ that was printed by a real estate 
firma Those kind of things. 
Well, our bulletin was issued this year; I believe on 
January 8. We cited all of these practices and said that we would 
vigorously enforce the rebate laws from that time forward. A couple 
of months later we began to get a number of complaints from title 
insurers that their competitors were violating this anti-rebate 
statuteo We made investigations and in every case subpoenaed 
evidenceo We recently levied rather heavy fines which totaled 
---·--·------- ·-------------------··-----·- ·::..--·-----. 
over $400, .9..Q.Q__2g_~-~p._f?_!; __ ~he •• • 
-------- ·-~ ...... . 
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: The rebate regulations applied to 
the title insurance company, to the buyer of the property, or to 
the real estate broker? 
MR. BAKER: The rebate statute is a very broadly worded 
statute. It forbids titl e insurers to pay any consideration to 
------- --- .. _ _________ ____ .. __ _ 
- - --------~- ----- ------- --- - --
either the purchaser of the insurance or his agent, which is the 
- ----.. -----~-------------~--- ·-- ... - - - ··· - -- -·- - . '('"--------- ----------
real estate agent or his lender. Now, we have observed, with one 
.-----------.. ____ --- ---
possible exception, there's just about no rebating directly to the 
consumer. 
-
· ---~~ ...... ·-- --- - -----·---...- --. - -~ ____ ,.. _______ _ 
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: I practice law and sometimes I get 
involved in real estate transactions for clients, and I think most 
of the title companies send me a calendar or something for Christmaso 
If they do, is that considered a rebate? 
. ···---...-- --- --- ----- ·-·-----·- ···--- ---· --·---- ·-· ---. - -
MR. BAKER: If you had directed, say, the title insur-
ance to a particular title insurer, as a consequen~~-- gf _ re~~J..~;ng 
- --- -
.------;>'-·-·---------------... ________ ,, ______ .. _ 
this calendar, that would be a rebate, yeso Now, of course, 
there are a minimum -- you have to show that there is an inducement. 
Yes. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: In other words, just showing that 
they sent me a calendar, you would have to show that the consider-
ation is a calendar, or lunch, or whatever it is, that I directed 
some business in that direction. 
MRo BAKER: I don't think that it would be necessary 
that you actually respond to the inducement, but you would have to 
show intent was to induce you to direct title -- that the title 
ins~rer · -~ in..t~n-t: was to ~nd}:IC~ .¥ou ~~ - direct title insurance_ t? 
them. Now, you might never send them a title policy, but if it can 
be demonstrated that they were attempting to induce you to by giv-
ing you some kind of consideration, that would be an unlawful re-
bate. They would be guilty of offering it, you would not, neces-
sarily, be guilty of accepting a rebate in that instance. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Apparently, some of the industry 
didn't believe you when you sent out your bulletin earlier this 
year. 
MRo BAKER: They believe us now. I think that's cor-
rect, although, in all honesty there was probably a great deal of 
disagreement as to the interpretation of some of the points in the 
bulletin. We thought that it was quite finite; we worked with 
the title insurance industry in arriving at language that every-
body could understand in this bulletin. But there seems to be at 
least in certain quarters some feeling that the bulletin would be 
enough by itself; that we would really never enforce it. And as 
a consequence, we found some extensive violatj,.ons of the bulletin, 
we don't believe that these violations are occurring today because 
we have enforced it and we've levied some very heavy fines. And we 
- so -
think that the rebating bulletin, essentially, accomplished it's 
purpose. The more serious and the kinds of practices which were 
·--------------
really corrosive on the industry were stopped quite soon after the 
~------------ ---·-------~-----------------------------·---------
bulletin was issued. Some of the lesser evil practices continued. 
-------------· --- -------------- --------·----- ---- ----------- ~- -
Entertainment was the one that we found more extensively continuing 
-------------- . ----- -- -- ---- ---- ... -........... - -- --- -- . - -- -
to occur, where the title insurer would take the real estate brokers 
- --
out to a lavish dinner, or take the whole office out to dinner and 
~ ---------------------------· --- ----------~--·--·-------- -------------·------------- -- -
cocktails and that kind of thing. And this was the principal 
------------ -------
--------'""'·-------·-· ....... -·- -·---- --
-------------- ··--------
violation that we foundo Although, we did find some other specific 
---- ----·--·--··---·-·····-· --· ····---· .. -·- ··-······· 
---...... ------- . - -- --~ -
violations that were of a more corrosive nature that tended to be 
actual dollars passing under the table to the people who direct the 
title insurance or escrow. The rebate bulletin also applies to 
------·--•··--• ••·-•·---- --- ~--·-·-•••r-••--• ··--~ 
the escrow activities of title insurers. 
-·-----______ _,......., __ . --------· .. ---~-·~-- .,. _ _, ~ ..,., ......... ~ ...... --~-
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: What is the evil of the rebate sit-
uation: how is the public contact? I'll say the entertainment 
parto How is the public harmed? 
MR. BAKER: If j;h_~:r;~were ve;:y _<!irect competition in 
------ · -- ~- . ·--··- ------
1 t~:_!'urchase c:>!_~~t-~_C:.!~~-u~':l~C:: __ it_~.oul_~n ~ ~ -~r~_babl~ m~~~e~.. But 
I w~~~- the __ J?.Ur~~~~~E_~-~-~i~l~~~s~r~=~- _:~~ies ~n ~i:_ a~ en~ _:_? _ ~o-
the best possible job for him, and find the lowest possible cost, 
·--·. 
~ - t~~t ag~nt directs ~~!le insurance to someone because of favors 
~ ~ - ~- ·-
\ that were done for the agent rather than for the benefits that are 
---·-- ... - - ·--- ·- - ~- - -- - -· -- - .. ·----- ---- ·- - -- - -· ~ 
to be derived by the purchaser of title insurance, then we think \ - - - - - - -- -. - - -
~pat competition is diminished to the extent that it does existo 
- ------ ·---··- ---
·---- ------- -~---
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: Is the industry competitive with 
respect to price on equality of products? 
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MR. BAKER: The industry has not been competitive in a 
'------~4-----···-- .. ·~-------~- - - ·-·-· -·- -----·- - . - .. -·--.-
normal sense with respect to price in the past. We see indications 
right now that both price and quality of product are becoming a 
focus of competition. We have seen a substantial reform recently 
by one title insurer. We have seen some price movement. There's 
one dominant insurer who recently attempted to increase the rate 
and the others didn't follow and it had to cut it backo 
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: U~1:_ll_j:.JJ,,i. s rece_nt develop~=!:.~!-_!~ 
really didn't make a~x__?i_f~erence where the real estate age~t 
. . . . -· . 
_9et the $ame quality product: he is going to pay the same price. 
MR. BAKER: Yes, the absence of competition on a price 
basis was probably, in part, because of the way the industry did 
compete. I think it's always competed in it one way or another. 
But industry _g:!-_g _ ~_ompe~-~ - ?Y. _focusing on the agent and doing fav:?rs 
for him. 
- -- -·· 
'l'ha't_ is _:t.he_ __ way_.the.y_ got . .business- -so -the -pri~~ -~~~~' t 
Well, if they're stopped from focusing on the agent and 
the favors that they can do him, it's our feeling that they will 
try to find some other way to get business, because they are an 
industry that does want to attract business. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Mr. Baker, how would the industry 
compete as to quality of services -- different types of coverage --
more extensive coverage? 
MR. BAKER: Yes, that's one of the ways. More extensive 
- ------------------------------------------------~ -- --
cover~-~· The speed with which the service is perforrnedo The 
- ----... -
experience in the title insurance business. To have a loss under 
title insurance is not something that anybody seeks: it's really 
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something that is to be avoided, so the insurer that does the 
quality job of searching title, will probably be used more than 
one that does not. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: That, of course, is something that 
/
you appreciate only if you ever sustained a loss or had a claim. 
Like I've owned several houses and I've had title insurance, and 
I I've never had a claim and I don't know what would happen if I do 
have a claim, hopefully things will work out all righto•o 
MR. BAKER: The ordinary buyer probably never would 
--· ·-·- - -~ . .. . · ---· -- ----~-
be exposed, except in a rare, rare instance to the quality of 
service issue from a claim standpoint. It would be the lenders 
•---w--·----·•-
•• -- -- · ----- - -
and the real estate brokers who would become more familiar with 
this aspect of the quality of service . 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Is it very likely to be the typical 
homeowner or his lender who is going to be confronted with this? 
I was thinking it might be other types of property that would be 
more subject to issues over title. 
MR. BAKER: Rural properti_~s often !_le <?_~~~_;t!;>j~~~~­
title issues. I would say that, if we can characterize any partie-
ular class of property as being more or less subject to issues of 
title. On the other hand, the dwelling prope;-!;_y .that .. haELphanged 
. -- - - -- -.... - - - - . . -- ---· ·- .. 
hands a number of times and in an urban envirorun~~!: J~ __ I_>_X:'?_e_~~ly 
- ..... --.- ----.-
----------------------------·--- _,_ ___ ------- ·· ·· ·· 
not going to be as subject to issues of title as, say, a ranch that 
... __ __ - - - - - - - '- -- -·-·-
was last sold by the family under a Spanish Land Granto 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: I'll give you an example: my 
brother and I have a small interest in a farm back in southern 
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Illinois and we don't have any idea how many people may have some 
claim to that property. The family has grown and gone on for 
several generations and has scattered to the four winds and the 
title to that thing is just hopeless. 
We have a cousin who happens to be in the title business 
back there and is now trying to piece it out, but I don't know if 
it will ever be pieced out. 
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: Mr. Chairman, you've reached the 
point where, and I've seen this from my own experience, one title 
company will insure a title, and take a chance on a certain type 
of title, let's say, where a more conservative company may not, 
and the real estate brokers are anxious to make the sale, and so 
you go with the title company that will take a chance. And I 
really don't see anything wrong with that, frankly, because some 
of these old Portuguese families, for example, they have wills, 
unprobated estates going back into the 19th century; there is no 
way on earth that you can really tie that up into a nice little 
package, somebody has to take a chance on it. Because otherwise 
nobody could ever own the property. 
MR. BAKER: I agree with you on that, Mr. Knox. The 
title ~ns_~~-e~.! i~ he elects to take that chance, makes it known 
to all of the parties exactly what the deficiences exist in the 
title ev~n though _it may insure against them. 
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: Not in my experienceo I mean he 
either says if the title is vested in so-and-so -- of course, they 
always put exceptions with respect to assessment bonds that may 
be outstanding or unrecorded deeds of trust, or somethingo But 
- 54 -
r 
if he says there is a possible interest of unknown heirs, why you 
------------
----·--. ··-··-- ---------·---------- -
haven't got a_Jnarke~able title and there's no way on earth that 
.------ ------- ·- --- --
doe~ _ _any, _ @_C?~--a~-~-.E-~_5'0~~- will p~~----~or it. 
MR. BAKER: Well, if he will insure against it, even 
though that's recognized, we see nothing wrong with that. But for 
the title insurer to recognize that there may be a deficiency of 
title and not disclose that to the buyer, I don't think it is in 
the best interest of the buyer, because regardless of the fact 
that the title is insured, as I said, the difficulties that arise 
when you can't deliver title to the next buyer -- good title to the 
next buyer, or if the title is attacked during the tenure of your 
ownership -- are very, very large for the owner of that property. 
It's a real problem for him; he may have the title insured all 
right, but there are many, many collateral considerations. 
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: You've got a covenant running with 
!\ the land, and you argue that this covenant has been abandoned by 
non-user, so the covenant running with the land no longer applies. \ 
\ And 
lr the covenant. 
not only that, but a quiet title decree. is obtained abQlishing 
--------------~ .. _..a __ __ 
somebodyo Well, the title insurer is taking a chance on that 
---~~ 
I 
appeal a hundred years later. It's a very slim chance, but some 
conservative companies won't insure and some will, and I don't 
I 
\ 
~ ~e anything wrong with that. 
MR. BAKER: I don't see anything wrong with it either 
for they do insure, but I think that at the same time if they 
conduct the title search and find this, and don't disclose it to 
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the buyer, as being a possibility of occurring, even though they're 
insuring it, I think they're not doing their job for the buyero 
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN: Larry, my understanding is they 
are not required then to disclose anything that they find prior to 
any issuance of title insuranceo Is that correct? 
MR. BAKER: Well, we find, for example, title insurers 
have had a tendency and some of them consider this as a service, 
and there is some controversy surrounding it. For example, to 
insure title and cover mechanic's liens on a building where they 
know that there are unpaid mechanics• debts, so it'~ almost in a 
way tantamount to suretyship. They recognize, for example, under 
a joint control situation, the lender has the money set aside to 
pay these bills from the contractor, who is buildjng a building, 
and this would typically take place on a new, large commercial 
enterprise. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN: And this could drastically affect 
the future of the property owner and is how he uses his property. 
MR. BAKER: To answer your first question, the answer 
is, yeso This is done where they insured title and did not dis-
close to the purchaser that there are certain defects in the title, 
or certain potential defects in the title that may occur. They 
will take the risk, as Assemblyman Knox has characterized it, and 
we see nothing wrong with that, but we do think that they should 
disclose it. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN: But the question becomes one of 
almost an ethical one, I guess, rather than one which would be 
perfectly legal and proper. Is that an appropriate term to use? 
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They are doing what is legal and proper, but perhaps there might 
be a question of ethically just exactly how far they should go or 
what they should do. 
MR. BAKER: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN: And could it be possible to man-
date that by law? 
MR. BAKER: Yes, I think it would be. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN: May I ask Mr. Knox a question 
on this? What would your reaction be to that? 
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: By saying by a law that you would 
have to disclose any potential interests? 
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN: If they found this in their in-
vestigation, as to Mr. Baker's illustration, would you see any-
thing particularly wrong with that? 
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: Well, I don't just offhand. I can 
see where it's going to be a lot of trouble, with the real estate 
·· industry because if you had a law, I don't know what the penalties 
would be, but suppose you didn't write down each potential interest, 
subsequent owners of the parcel may seek to enforce this covenant. 
Well, I mean this is going to confuse a lot of people and may 
v 
worry a lot of lenders and I am not just sure how much it is in 
the public interest. You know that the insurance company, in my 
opinion at least, isn't going to insure the title unless they are 
awfully sure that it is O.K. They may be willing to take a slight 
risk, but a major risk, they presumably would not take because it 
is in their interest not to have these claims because claims 
certainly go far beyond the amount collected in premiums. I'm not 
- 57 -
so sure that the company won't look at it but offhand, it doesn't 
seem like a great idea to me. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Such a law, of course, would re-
quire certain judgmental decisions on the part of the title in-
surers because I assume we wouldn't want them to report that there 
are frivolous possibilities; there would have to be a substantial 
possibility. Of course, this might in turn increase the cost of 
title insurance. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN: Is it possible in your estimation, 
Larry, to legally define this to eliminate frivolous disclosures? 
MR. BAKER: Well, in a sense, of course, it's what the 
title insurance policy is all about. A title insurance policy is 
akin to an errors and omissions type of policy. The title insurer 
examines the title and then issues the policy that says that it 
guarantees that its work is correct. It seems to me when he examines 
the title it would be our feeling that where there is any kind of 
possibility that is a real one and not a frivolous one of attack 
on the title, he has a duty to disclose that to the parties to the 
transaction. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN: It's not an exclusion ••• 
MR: BAKER: But how would you work that into some kind 
of statutory scheme, I'm not too sure. 
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: They used to always point out the 
old racial covenants that existed for many years. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Shelly v. Kramer (1948) outlawed 
these covenants. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: But for some years after that case 
they still disclose these covenants. They still vest the title but 
they say subject to this covenant, or whatever the racial covenant 
----------· ·-----------·--· --··----
was. Well, now I don't think they bother to list them anymore. 
But they used to, so you could argue thato There potentially was 
some kind of problem with regard to race or coloro 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Well, is there any law on this 
now: any case law, statutory or regulation or any ••• 
MR. BAKER: I couldn't tell you what the status of the 
case law is if they fail to disclose something that they are aware 
of and later subjects the title to some kind of attack. I suspect 
------ -·····~-··--... --. ~ -·-·-
that the general rule would probably be that they would at least 
waive whatever limits they have on their policy, in those circum-
stanceso 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: You think they would waive the 
limits on their policy? 
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN: The policy is a contract, Mr. 
Chairman, it would be a fraudulent contract in that sense, are 
you indicating? 
MR. BAKER: I suppose the issue of good faith would 
be raised. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Like an insurance company in an 
auto case not conveying offers to their clients that they should 
have conveyed and not settling in good faith and then being held 
liable for above the policy limits. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN: Well, Mr. Chairman, I can see 
your problem with what he was saying -- if provided it's spelled 
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out, what is insured and what exclusions there are, but calling 
attention to specific things. And that was what I was getting at 
and how you define that particular thing~ But I suppose that it 
- r 
... 
could be done. Your answer was "yes 11 you think it could be done 
statutorily. 
MR. BAKER: I think it could be done statutorily in 
the same sense that it's done for real estate brokers. For example, 
they have a positive duty to make full disclosure. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Well, there may be more to this 
idea than meets the eye, at first. If you have any other thoughts 
or suggestions on this we'll be glad to have you share them with 
MR. BAKER: May I go on just very briefly, into title 
insurance rating and give you just a recent history on that? As I 
said, for a number of years the title insurance industry, r3~~~r 
comfortabhr_,_ drifted along without a great deal of g,n.y . price. -~.om-
----·-· --
petition per se, and the title insurance industry's rate structure 
- ·- ~--- ·- -· -· -·- - ~··· --
was something that was born in antiquity: nobody seems to be able 
to tell us exactly how that structure was arrived at. It simply 
seems to be a mechanism by which the industry seeks to gain 
sufficient revenues to cover their costs and provide for profit. 
The rate scales increase the cost of title insurance with increases 
in the amount of the transaction. Now, at first blush, one could 
say that doesn't make much sense because it doesn't take any more 
in the way of cost to examine a title on a relatively low valued 
transaction than it does on a relatively high valued transactiono 
One must, of course, recognize that even though the loss ratios 
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are quite low for title insurance, there are financial risks in 
issuing the policies and they probably are entitled to more pre-
mium for a higher valued transaction where there is a greater 
amount of insurancea But whether or not that proportionately 
follows with the price of the property is, I believe, an open 
question and I don't think we or the title insurance industry have 
the answer to that question at this point in time. Now, for a 
number of years, there was no rate law that applied to title in-
surance. Two years ago, there was a move on the part of the fed-
eral government to bring title insurance costs within the scope of 
regulatory authorities vested in certain agencies in federal g~v­
ernrnent and you are familiar with the reports of the Department 
of Housing and Urban Development, which we made available to the 
committee that focused on these particular issues. As a conse-
quence of those moves, the title insurance industry saw that there 
was probably some question about whether or not their costs carne 
within the protection of the Mccarren Act as it was intended by 
Congress, since there was a virtual void of law relating directly, 
at least, to rate regulation and as a consequence they proposed 
initially a law which would have required our department's prior 
approval of any rates before they could be put into effect. It's 
the so-called "prior approval rating law" where a filing would be 
submitted with statistical justification as to cost and then the 
department would examine it's filing and say, yes or no as to 
whether or not the filing was approved and the title insurer could 
~se those rates. Our reaction to that law was that our experience 
under the open competition law, the McBride-Grunsky Law, has been 
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that this is a more satisfactory method of regulating costs for 
the insurance industry than one where we give specific approval 
to rates, or where we promulgate rateso In general, the McBride-
Grunsky Act has been very effective in the casualty/property 
business, and the primary reliance is on competition in that law. 
I would say that our general experience is that an open competition 
law is more exacting in the demands that it makes on the insurers 
than anything that the Legislature can legally structure that 
would enable us to directly regulate rateso Competition can be a 
very tough taskmaster. But we observed that there was very little 
price competition per se within the title insurance industryo So 
- - -· -
we felt that there were really three things that had to occur if 
we could move to a competitive system. One was that there must be 
positive effort to discourage or to absolutely prohibit any kind 
of collusion on the part of the title insurers in the establishment 
of rates. Second, the focus of competition must be taken off the 
---- --
---
__ zgbate -- type -Of aG-tivities and put more on to other types o_f -~c­
tivities; the quality and cost of title insurance. And third, an 
examination must be made of the whole environment that title in-
surance sits in as to the means and mechanism of competition. In 
that sense, we feel that there is a need to explore different 
ways by which it's possible for the people who make the purchasing 
decisions of title insurance to have an interest in, and focus 
on the cost of that coverage. Now that could be done in a number 
of ways. One of the ways, of course, in which it is done, is 
that if one title insurer's rates are much higher than the others, 
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the person who directs them -- that business, to the extent that 
they must pass those costs on and to the extent that their ex-
perience in the market place is affected by it, will suffer a loss 
of business, if they direct their business to people who charge 
too much. But there are other mechanisms which we are studying 
and we are trying to come to focus on; the means by which title 
insurers compete and make maximum usage of the competitive market 
place. 
Now, when the title insurance industry carne to us and 
asked whether or not we would support this prior approval law, we 
asked them to consider a McBride-Grunsky type of open competition 
law and to experiment with that type of a regulatory approach for 
a period of time to see if we could bring vigorous price compe-
tition to the title insurance market and to essentially regulate 
through examination of what the title insurers actually do and by 
looking at each individual title insurer rather than looking at 
them through some kind of a prior approval on statistics. I 
mentioned before this structure of increasing cost of title in-
surance in relationship to the costs that they actually incur. 
It's been observed in other studies. For example, there was a 
rather exhaustive study in Pennsylvania that when the average 
value of a transaction of the real estate transactions that are 
conducted in any given year changes or shifts to where there are 
a number of high-valued transactions versus a low number of high-
valued transactions, one year to the next, this has a very heavy 
impact on the profits of the industryo The inference would seem 
to be that the industry derives most of its profits from the very 
- 63 -
high valued transactions. This, in turn, so the title insurance 
industry would have us believe, means that the high valued trans-
actions are subsidizing the low valued transactions, and they may 
have maintained this to us, represented to us. our own observation 
of this phenomena is that it's probably indicative that there isn't 
much price competition and that you really don ' t have an open 
market situation at the present time. If you did have an open 
market situation, then there would be more competition for the 
high valued transactions and the price would go down. 
At the same time, we're really not too inclined to 
accept this idea that there is, in fact, a cost subsidy. If this 
were to be accepted on its face, then the implication would be 
that no small title insurer could ever break into the market place 
because when a small title insurance company comes into the market 
place, it's forced to essentially deal in the re1atively modest 
transactions. They don't come in and get a $30 million dollar 
building that's changing hands, if they only have a net worth of 
$2 or $3 million. So as a consequence, if one accepted the idea 
that the small or low valued transaction were subsidized by a 
high valued transaction, you'd say that this is really an anti-
competitive type of price structure which freezes people out, and 
we have observed that this is not, in fact, the case. Small 
title insurers are able to enter the market, and have been able 
to enter the market. They have difficulties naturally, but we 
feel that they are able and have been able to get into the market 
in California and have been able to make a profit. 
- ~ -
Well, the overall conclusion that one would draw from 
this, is that the title insurance industry can stand a lot of 
honing. Probably, its profits, from our observation over a long 
'--------
period of time -- which is probably really the only fair way to 
measure this type of industry's profits because it's very cyclical 
-- changes from year to year, but..it:_ Y.C?~.- +Q9'k at it over a long 
period of tj.me, I don•t thi.nk.--¥O.ll.. .. .C.9.Yld draw th~L.C.-O.nclu~:j..on that ......._____ ...-----~------ - ... ___________ - - . -- --
the profits are exhorbitant or that they are really even excessive 
---------------·-----·--·-~·-·-•-"'' ____ 0 '' oo•..-ti•r•-•~•••-• ...-------~·~' •••-••-·---· 4"''••~ 0 -·· 
or that they are neces§,£~..rily higher than the industry averages, 
- ---------------------------------- ···--- ----------- ----··-· ~ - . 
but I think prg]d,gbl.,y __ .on~ . could observe that while the profits may 
----- ---- -·· --- --- ------------·--------------·------------ ------------------ ... 
not be as high __ ~fi ... they__c;ould be, the operating methods could be 
----------- ... ·-·-- - -------- -·-·-·- ·---------- ... --·-····- -·--·-- ·-"--------. 
improved terrifically, and that this ~-~-- . C?!l~ .. 2~ .... !:h~- §f.f.e_c.ts .... .o_f .._ ______________________________ - -
competitiono It isn't always a result of not having competition 
- --- -
that you have excessive profits; often times the results is that 
you simply have a laxity of management which doesn't operate in 
the most efficient way. They get comfortable and fat and don't 
really look for the improved methods that technology can bring . 
Now I think that this is beginning to occur in the title insurance 
industry. It has been occurring over the past couple of years, 
it's a slow start. I think the industry has a long way to go. 
It would be our recommendation, certainly, that the main focuses 
of the regulatory environment and the legislative environment be 
to enhance the competitive environment of title insurers. So that 
they are held to the fires of open market, the free competition 
environment. If there are any questions, I would be glad to try 
to respond. 
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CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Very good. Are there any questions? 
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: Yes, I have a feeling that the 
cost of transferring property, real property between a willing 
buyer and a willing seller is probably too much, perhaps exorbi-
tant in california. Let me state my posture. I have two questions. 
Next week my committee will be here on a Tuesday discussing the 
Auditor General•s Report that some of the functions performed by 
the Department of corporations could be performed by the Department 
of Consumer Affairs or the Secretary or State or vice versa, because 
they have to do with the same thing. So we are taking testimony 
on that. Now this could apply equally well to your department, and 
my question is: Should matters applying to the same transaction, 
such as real estate transactions, be regulated by the same unit of 
government? 
MR. BAKER: I 1 d be glad to respond to that, Mr. Culleno 
The same question exists in our mindo we•ve observed certain sit-
uations for example, principally in the escrow field of where the 
Department of Corporations regulates the independent escrow com-
panies, the banking department regulates the banks who perform 
many escrows, the savings and loan department regulates the savings 
and loan, and they have escrows and we regulate title insurers and 
they do escrows. And we find differing postures among these dif-
ferent regulatory agencies, and often rather vigorously diverse 
views on what ought to be allowed or what ought not to be allowed, 
so I think there could be many arguments for regulating at least 
certain aspects of the things that relate directly to a real estate 
transaction in a single department. On the other hand, there are 
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some things that argue against that. One of the things as it 
relates to title insurance, at least, is that there is a need to 
regulate for solvency. It is very important, I think, that title 
insurers remain solvent. If you are going to regulate for solvency 
you must do so with a regulatory agency that has some expertise 
in that field: for example, one could be inclined to say we ought 
to put title insurance in the real estate department . There are 
many arguments that would augur in favor of that . On the other 
hand, I don't think the real estate department has any expertise 
at all in looking in financial condition surveillance such as we 
haveo So there are different forces that go in that way, but it 
is certainly something that is worthy of exploration, at least . 
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: My next question is quite separate 
from that. We touched upon rebates, calendars and gifts . I think 
it's apparent to everyone that if there is business entertainment 
or rebate or gifts that the cost of·that will be paid by the 
ultimate buyer/consumer. Now, if there were no laws on this 
matter, at the present time, do you think it would be appropriate 
to outlaw business entertainment of retailers by manufacturers 
throughout our state? 
MR. PAYNE: Mr . Cullen, I would like to answer that, 
if I may. I think you have a different situation here totally, 
in that there is a law that ••• 
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: ••• no, no . That's not fair. 
MR. PAYNE: If there's no law -- let me tell youo I 
think that as long as there is no competition, as long as the 
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competition takes place at the point of the real estate agent or 
the escrow, I don't think you are ever going to get price compe-
tition. Because I don't think there is a necessity for price 
competitiono 
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: What you are saying is that where 
the manufacturer of sofas, chairs, toilet fixtures, is entertain-
ing various retailers, there is nothing wrong with that. 
MR. PAYNE: Because they have price competition, 
vicious price competition. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: Another category where the State 
of California approves the price is with liquor and milk, that's 
all right. 
MR. PAYNE: I'm not even going to get into that. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: Well, no, but it is fair trade. 
If you are going to fix the price, if you want to fix the price, 
you don't want anyone going around and providing cabinets or 
shelveso Now in this business, wrere there is no fixed price, 
your stated justification is that because there is no competition, 
all of the manufacturers are in a position to entertain lavishly 
and load up on the consumer. 
MRo PAYNE: Absolutely. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: Is that right? 
MR. PAYNE: That money is going to the real estate 
agent and escrow company rather than the consumer. There is not 
a necessity at this point in time for price competition because 
you obtain the business at the source. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: We can probably do something about 
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that . Now Larry Baker brought up another pointo I encountered an 
experience in connection with a purchase of a condominium by a 
person in my officeo The seller had a loan commitment at a neat 
low percentage, like 8~~ and the going market was 9~, so that this 
is an inducement. Well, then on the list of costs were all these 
various things over here: title insurance, escrow, and so forth . 
And one interesting cost was this $16 for the disbursement of im-
pound of funds. Now I had never seen that before and I told this 
staff person you should have inquired about thato And they said 
we are charging you because we•re paying your taxes and we•re do-
ing this and we•re doing the other thingo Now we mentioned here 
earlier this morning that they are also holding that money without 
paying interest, to defray such handling of costs. In any event, 
the point was made by the seller, you don•t have to buy from us, 
we have a waiting list . If you don•t like our 8~~, you don•t like 
our $16 charge, we don•t care, which kind of goes against my graino 
We have a number of bills saying that various retailers may not 
dictate the fire insurance company, or may not dictate the mort-
gage insurance company, but here obviously when you have a buyer/ 
seller arrangement, they are in a superior position, the sale has 
been agreed upon, but then come the costs and it just leaves me 
with an uneasy feeling. But you•ve mentioned that you are em-
phasizing the rebate because you think that•s important, but are 
you in a position or should the State Legislature also initiate 
bulletins making practices such as I have described -- regulating 
them or making them illegal and saying that you must give the 
buyer the choice of his title insurance . You may not charge for 
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disbursing impounds unless you pay interest on the deposit of 
those thingso It's possible, but probably not for your department. 
MR. PAYNE: I would like to make one point here before 
we get off this. We talk about calendars and a free lunch. But 
that is not what we are after. That doesn't concern us. We are 
talking about sizeable rebateso We're talking abo.ut, _fq~ inst:ance, 
title companies supplying a Cadillac to drive for the agent or 
,. - . . 
s~pply~n~ of~~~~_ fur~iture and equipment for a realtor. We are 
·----- - · - .. -
talk!~~ about the realtors who are given free credit cards where 
~~ey can ~~tertain at ~heir wish, themselves or any friends at 
restaurants. We're t_~lking about trips _ ~o exotic places. These 
--- ----- ---· -
are meaningful cost items which are being paid, and those are the 
things we're after. The industry kind of hung us up on a $5 lunch 
or a $7 . 50 lunch. That•s not really what we're after . We are 
after that big money, and it was there. That was the way they 
were ~~mpeting. 
--
It is a very difficult thing and we have tried to 
create rules by which they wish to playa That's the whole thrust. 
We said, 11 Look, how should we be regulated? 11 We got together and 
built 31 points of things that were 11 no-no's" and then we said, 
11 0 . K., this is the way you are going to play the game 11 • And then 
they were terribly horrified when we issued subpoenas and this 
information turned up about the rebates that had continued~ and 
my statutory responsibility is to enforce that regulation. So 
until you people change it, we have no alternative. I think the 
bulletin has done the job because I think it got the attention of 
the boards of directors of the title companies and I think it's 
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our fault this time that we are idiots for creating such a thing, 
but next time it will be the fault of the executive officer of 
that title company. 
MR. BAKER: I think, if I might add just one comment 
here, to focus on your point that there seems to be a number of 
different costs that emerge out of a real estate transaction which 
often come as a surprise to the purchaser after he has made the 
decision to buy a particular piece of property. He is more or 
less half way down the transaction and when he looks at a pretty 
substantial real estate transaction, $30, $40, or $50 thousand, 
a $16 cost doesn't mean anything to him, but when he looks at the 
aggregate of it, and he gets a bill for a couple of thousand 
dollars for all of the closing items then it does add up. I 
think that there are two things that are important that distinguish 
this from a typical manufacturer/retailer kind of transaction. 
One is, that in a manufacturer/retailer situation, you are not 
dealing with a situation where the retailer has a fiduciary duty 
to the purchaser, whereas, I think in a real estate transaction, 
that the real estate broker does have a fiduciary duty to his 
principal a 
By the same token, the escrow holder has a fiduciary 
duty to his principals . Certainly the concept of full disclosure 
before the transaction, before the purchaser of real estate gets 
so far into the transaction that he can hardly turn around and 
back out, this concept should be promoted so the $16 doesn't come 
as a surprise. Also •• • 
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ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: Larry, you're not talking about 
the same thing at all. Because the fiduciary relationship is 
between the seller, and the consumer walks in and signs the docu-
ment and then he starts this escrow procedure. There's no one, 
I don't believe, with whom he stands in a ficuciary relationship. 
MR. BAKER: Unless he has a real estate broker assist-
ing him in the purchase of the ••• 
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: Which may be unlikely in these 
condominium sales. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: It is my understanding that real 
estate brokers take the position that they in many cases are agents 
for both sides. 
MR. BAKER: T~~Y-.. ~E~--~~-~~C:i~~X- agents fo:J;" bq:t_h _ ~ ;i..des 
when they ?tGt, .. foJ;" ~~~Il!P~_e_, .. ~s ~~crow agents. The other thing that 
I think should be examined is trying to find as many ways as 
possible to limit the number of separate chargeable items that 
can be charged. It seems to me that, for example, when you pay 
an escrow fee for handling an escrow that to charge separately for 
disbursement of some kind of funds or for holding some kind of 
other funds -- many of the kinds of things should not be added on 
as an additional amount. I think the same kind of thing perhaps 
applies with the lenders and with the title insurerso There have 
been some suggestions made which we've looked at as to how to do 
this in title insurance, but we haven't formed any real conclusions 
on them one way or anothero 
For example, a suggestion has been made to make the 
- "'!.. ~ ... 
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lender pay for :!:12-~t:i,t.le...-i-as-lil-:F•ncer that_'..!_l c~~~-~-_.cq_ro.p_~tit_ign. 
----------
That's Senator Proxrnire•s suggestion. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Any other questions? Thank you 
very much. I believe our next witness is Mr. David G. Jackson. 
Mr. Jackson is an attorney and you were counsel in Garrett v. 
Coast Federal case, I understand. And that case had to do with 
what is a permissible late charge. 
MRo DAVID G. JACKSON: Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentle-
meno I will address myself solely to this business of late charges. 
For four years I have been working on this one thing to the exclu-
sion of about 80 percent of my practice. I am a sole practitioner 
in the City of Arcadia. At the present time I am the attorney for 
the plaintiff in nine other similar class actions regarding the 
refund of late charges. 
The problem is very simple. We have a code section 
1670 of the Civil Code of the State of california which bans 
contractual penalities. Now this is not a code section that was 
adopted by our forebearers in 1870o Contractual penalties were 
banned in England 400 years ago, and I cited to the california 
Supreme Court the case of the case of Peach vso the Duke of 
Sommerset, back in 1636, that disproved of charging penalities to 
coerce performance. I have read this committee's report back in 
1969, and I might quote from that report. "The purpose of the 
late fee is to insure prompt payment." To insure prompt payment. 
That, sir, is a coercive languageo Now the California Supreme 
Court is my baby. I have been honored by law review people all 
over the United States; I have been honored by the law book 
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publishers with the words, "This is a landmark case you have there, 
nave... And I feel it is. 
The california Supreme Court said, "Well, we've been 
approving of these things for 80 years now, as far back as 1894, 
but we guess it's wrong". The California Supreme Court said, "Yes, 
it is wrong". We're going to have to come up with something better. 
Now, they've got a problem. I assume I do not know those gentle-
men personally, but I assume that this decision was something that 
was hammered out as a bit of a compromise. Because you have another 
code section in California law, section 3302 of the Civil Code, 
which says that the only measure of damages for failure to pay 
money is interest. I argued this point to Donald R. Wright. He 
questioned me on it very specifically. I said these people owe a 
total refund of all these penalties that they collected. The Chief 
Justice and the rest of the Judges in their infinite wisdom said, 
"No, section 3302 does not apply"o They never mentioned it in the 
Garrett case, but they, in effect said it does not apply the 
savings and loan industry is entitled to a set-offo A set-off 
equal to their actual damages for a late chargeo The damages 
reasonably related to the collection of a late charge. Now, this 
is where it is at today. The use of that grammar. These cases 
are pending right now. I have seven of the best law firms ir ~he 
State of California here in the Los Angeles Superior Court accus-
ing me of selling out to Horne Savings and Loan because I worked 
out a settlement with Horne Savings and Loano Not Coast Federal. 
Probably the biggest settlement, so their attorneys tell me; the 
biggest refund ever offered to a class by a savings and loan in 
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california. At the present time the value of this settlement is 
roughly $1,400,000. The terms of the settlement provide for: a 
refund of 20 percent of all the late charges collected, a reduction 
of the late charge from a figure equal to one-sixth of one percent 
of the payors balance to 10 percent of the payors payment. The 
law firms in San Francisco, in Alameda County, San Mateo County, 
say I have sold out; say that the 10 percent figure is unrealistic. 
I don't think they want to quibble with me so much about the 
million dollar cash refund to the members of the class. It is the 
amount of the monthly late charges that they are quibbling with. 
And gentlemen, I agree with them to a degree. I think it is un-
realistic. I am a practicing lawyer trying to settle a law suit 
for 20,000 peopleo Now, Mr. Deddeh had a bill, I understand it 
died in committee, a joint committee, hearing on the last day of 
the last session of the last legislative meeting, and that bill 
provided for 10 percent late charge. There were amendments to 
that bill for four and six percent late charges of the payment, 
and I question what's fairo 
A man has a $200 a month house payment. Is it fair 
to say that this $20 late charge is fair. is that reasonable? 
Four years ago I would have said this is outrageous. There is 
no rational relationship between the $20 and the damage done to 
the savings and loan institution. Today I am not so sureo The 
savings and loan industry, and I don't want to ever have anybody 
accuse me of sounding like a parrot for them, but nevertheless, 
the fact is they are not banks. They do not handle auto contracts 
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or house trailer contracts, refrigerators, or what have you, they 
handle home purchases, and that's all they handle. Some of them 
now do handle house trailer contracts. But their measure of 
damages is not that easy to determineo There's one obvious measure 
of damage. A man has for example a 10 percent loan and his house 
payment is $200 and he is 30 days late, then they are obviously 
damaged one-twelfth of 10 percent of $200. A buck and a half, or 
whatever. That's an obvious measure of damages. 
Now I have done discovery with some of the smaller 
savings and loans, and I have made some settlements with them. 
Some of the smaller saving and loans have not given me the degree 
of difficulty that the larger ones have. And some fascinating 
figures have popped upo They seem to have a constant: 
a), One out of six people pays three late charges a yearo It 
seems to be a constant. 
b) The amount of cost to the savings and loans to process 
in the light of the Garrett decision amounts to anywhere from 5o6 
percent of the payment to 15 percent of the paymento A very 
interesting figure. I'm well aware of the fact. My boy works on 
the hill in Washington. He was the first one to call and tell me 
that the State of New York passed a two percent of the payment 
late charge bill. He was dumbfounded. Two percent barely covers 
the loss of interest to the savings and loan. 
In the Garrett case, they came out with a paragraph 
I wish they had never included. When I read it I was sick. "We 
do not hold herein, that merely because the late charge provision 
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is void and thus cannot be used in determining the lenders' damages, 
the borrower escapes unscathed. He remains liable for the actual 
damages resulting from his default . The lenders• charges could be 
fairly measured by the period of time the money was wrongfully 
withheld plus the administrative costs reasonably related to 
collecting and accounting for a late paym.ento 11 
Well, I have spent a year and a half reading that 
paragraph over at 3 a.m. in my sleepo What does it mean? If you 
get together the best accountants in America and you ask them 
"what items are reasonably related to collecting a late charge? 11 , 
the accountants will say to you, "Sir, according to accepted 
accounting procedures .. -- according to accepted accounting 11pro-
cedures11 you must consider these items. Then we get into the 
question of what percentage of the President's salary, his Cadillac, 
the retirment fund, the coffee fund, and everything else should 
be attributable to the collection of · late chargeso Frankly, from 
my further discovery of the cooperative savings and loans, I 
don't think they know. Now, I'm going to cut it off right now 
with one suggestiono It's a very simple suggestion and you, 
gentlemen, have the power to implement ito I don't!. For me, as 
a one man practitioner, to demand a discovery necessary to get 
this answer, there is no way I can do ito You, gentlemen, have 
the power. You can simply say that the industry has to prove to 
us what its late charges are; prove to us what it costs . You 
men have the power to do this, I don't. I've run out of gas, to 
be very frank. I have a rough idea of what is in store for the 
members of the class of people that I represent in nine different 
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class actions. There is no way that I can make that determination 
within a five year period. Of course, we have a five year dis-
missal period in this State. There's no way I can do it; it's 
impossible. You, gentlemen, can say, we have decided in our in-
finite wisdom that 6% of the payment is fairo If you can prove 
to us differently, come forward and do ito I have nothing furthero 
Any questions, I will be happy to answero 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Any questions? Well, thank you 
very much, Mr. Jacksono Do I understand that you are in the 
process of settling the Garrett case, then? 
MR. JACKSON: No, I am not in the process of settling 
the Garrett case. There is something further that I might add on 
that. The defendant has put forward the proposition which I 
believe is absolutely unwarranted. You, gentlemen, of the State 
Legislature, they argue, and the Supreme court of the State of 
California have absolutely no business whatsoever telling them what 
late charge they can charge, because since they are a fede=al 
agency chartered by the Congress of the United States, the State 
of california has been preempted. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Did they raise this defense in the 
original action? 
MR. JACKSON: They have raised that defense and it is 
now pending before Judge Matt Burns in the Federal Court here in 
Los Angeleso But I believe it's a specious defense and it will 
be shot down eventually. But in the meantime the years go by and 
here's the problemo Here is the problem with these class actions. 
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Statistically, one out of 60 will sell their home this 
year. Now, if these people sell their homes, they may be members 
of the class with a refund coming, but they're gone. We'll never 
find them; we'll never be able to give them a refund. So the 
longer they can stall these cases, the more difficult it becomes 
to ever find the member of the class to give them a refund. Any-
thing further, gentlemen? 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: I think not. Thank you very 
much for coming in. 
Perhaps this might be an appropriate time for you ••• 
MR. BOB DeKRUIF: I'm Bob DeKruif representing H. F. 
Ahmanson & Company, and I'm not a technician, as most of you know, 
but I thought for the consideration of the Committee in reference 
to a couple of statements that have been previously made, which 
were true statements as far as they go. But I think that knowing 
you as the Committee; knowing that Mr. Steve Baker is interested 
in consumer affairs, that something of interest on these late pay-
ment charges would be of interest to the Committee and to Mr. 
Baker. They're both interested in consumers; you, as the Com-
mittee are interested in consumers; you, as the committee are 
interested in constituents. Mr. Baker mentioned this morning that 
the late charge for FHA, I believe, and VA would be 4%, and other 
statements have been made that the State of New York has come 
through with 2%. 
I think something that the Committee should take under 
consideration -- that these are the records I just got five minutes 
ago bringing it current -- that on our conventional loans where 
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we, as Mr. Jackson has mentioned, charge 10%. Our conventional 
loan delinquency ratio, which I think you should be interested in 
from the consumer-constituent standpoint, is .583 on 30 to 59 
days. On our FHA loans, it's 8.832; on our VA loans, it's 5.973, 
which is just comparing the conventional, and the VA is ten times 
as much, ten times the percentage amount. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Those are the people who are 
delinquent 30 to 59 days? 
MR. DeKRUIFF: Thirty to 59 days, and 60 to 89 days 
runs about the same pattern and 90 and over, and the total relates 
perfectly again as it averages out on the conventional loan, it's 
.827 or o877, I can't read the writing hereo On the VA, it's 
8.127 and on the FHA, it's 11.455. For the benefit of the Corn-
mittee and the Department of Consumer Affairs, I don't know whether 
you want your consumers and constituents in this state of affairs, 
or not. Thank youo 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: All right. Thank you very much. 
Mr. McCarthy, do you want to come forth and make some comments? 
MR. McCARTHY: Well, Mr. Chairman, I have no prepared 
statement. Obviously, we weren't aware the testimonies were to 
be given by the Commissioner. We have, however, reserved some 
time for the November 22 hearing of this Committee for purposes 
of rebuttal. I can mention two things, one with respect to the 
mechanic's lien coverage and the knowledge of defects in title 
and the failure to report them. I think there is evidence of 
complete misunderstanding on the part of Mr. Baker of the effect 
of doing just those things. If you do, in fact, know of a defect 
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of title that is of record and you don't show it, you just bought 
it under your policy. There is absolutely no incentive on the 
part of a title insurer, who knows of a defect in title, not to 
show that, unless he intends to pay the cost of perfecting title. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Mr. McCarthy, I presume something 
like a mechanic's lien.o. 
MR. McCARTHY: Well, I was going to get into a 
mechanic's lien.o. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Well, I thought that was what 
you were talking abouta Well, I think he bought it, and in other 
words, he would have to pay it off. Right? 
MR. McCARTHY: That's right. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Now, of course, I can see that. 
On the other hand, there are some other defects in title that are 
not quite that simple. Aren't there? 
MR. McCARTHY: Well, in the mechanic's lien there isa 
This is probably the most difficult area of law dealing with real 
property that the insurers have to be confronted with. The simple 
fact is, on any new construction, there's always the potential of 
a mechanic's lien; but the point of this is, that the priority of 
that mechanic's lien is on the date that construction commenced. 
You have a two-year construction project and a mechanic, a laborer 
is not paid on the sixth month of year two, the priority of that 
lien is not at the time he's not paid, but it refers back to the 
date that the job commenced. So, if you insured certain funds 
that were forwarded in the year one, the potential priority of 
that mechanic's lien a year and a half later, is a year in advance 
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of the lien of the first Deed of Trust, or whatever insurance has 
been given. So, this is always present, we protect as best pos-
sible to make sure the payment is madeo. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Well, I understand there are 
complexities in the law of mechanic's liens. However, as you 
indicated, you can at least get rid of that problem, if worse 
comes to worse by buying a mechanic's lien. I think Mr. Baker 
was talking more about other types of potential title defects which 
might make it, in fact, impossible to give good title, and while 
money might pay you off in a sense, yet maybe you might rather 
have the land than the money. You can get the land by taking a 
mechanic's lien, but you might not be able to get the land in the 
face of some other defects. 
MR. McCARTHY: I'm not familiar with the defects that 
he had in mind, but the service that we provide is to secure 
title and possession of real property, and not something other 
than that. 
On the area of rate regulation that Mro Baker indicated 
that we participated in the drafting of the new regulation law for 
the State of California~ however, he indicated that there is a 
new law that went into effect pursuant to the wishes of the De-
partment of Insurance. This is a McBride-Grunsky form of insurance, 
giving the Insurance Commissioner full power to regulate the rates 
of title insurance in this State. 
There was a reference to rebates. I believe the im-
pression was created that this is a practice that is going on 
today in california. The position of the industry is that although 
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there possibly may have been some abuses in the past, that is not 
the case today . In the event of these fines that were levied, it 
is my understanding that the department•s subpoena expense record 
multiplied that amount by five percent, levied a fine, and then 
in turn told the insurer to justify to us the fact that these were 
not entertainment expenses in violation of Bulletin 74-2. There•s 
no permanent finding in any of these cases that we are aware of, 
of the types of 11 lavish activities 11 o These would be, as the 
commissioner indicated, events which had taken place in the past, 
but we will have more specific responses to those before the Com-
mittee at a later time. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Any questions? O.K. Thank you. 
Mr. DeKruif, it just occurred to me that there are 
just one or two things I would like to ask you to clarify. I 
take it from your testimony that you are saying that the substantial 
late charge, in effect, discourages people from making late pay-
ments? And that would be the thrust of these respective percentage 
figures from FHA and conventional loans, etc. 
MR. DeKRUIF: Yes, I would like to correct one word 
you used, 11 substantial 11 • 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Well, at least more substantial 
than whatever -- I mean that would be a difference in degreeo That 
leads me to my next question. What is an appropriate late penalty? 
Mro DeKRUIF: I prefaced my remarks that I am not a 
technician and a lot of this will come out in Mr. McKenna, and 
Mr. Pratt•s testimony tomorrow, but I, again, am speaking from a 
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practical standpoint of knowing the reaction you get from con-
sumers and constituents. If I heard Mr. Jackson say that for the 
benefit of the class, that he settled with us, I do not know the 
details of the case. I just tried to find them out by telephone 
on the basis of 10%. If after all his study and work, if I under-
stood him correctly, then I would accept that, and that is what we 
accepted in Mro Deddeh's bill. We supported that all the way 
through and have the year before, and Assemblyman Pearson's bill, 
I think, was the same bill. We've always supported that position. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Of course, Mro Jackson may have 
settled this case or perhaps this case will be settled, and yet 
the basic thrust of the Garrett case is going to have to be dealt 
with in some manner; that is, it says that a late fee must be 
reasonable, must be related to the cost of processing and the 
actual loss, and whether that is actually decided in this case, or 
not, it's going to . be decided somewhere along the way, either by 
further cases or by the Legislature. 
MR. DeKRUIF: Now, I'm assuming, and I shouldn't 
assume that he must have put in an awful lot of work and an awful 
lot of study to arrive that was if he was doing it for the 
benefit of all the people that he was doing it for, he must have 
done this and thinking it was fair. I'm sure he wouldn't settle 
on that basis, and I'm sure, assuming too, that he had some cost-
factors that went into that, that proved that that was a legitimate 
deal. I just assume ••• 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: I rather deduced from his testi-
mony that he was somewhat frustrated trying to figure out what 
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it was. 
MR. DeKRUIF: Well, again, I tried to get the benefit 
of what went into our arrangement, which I understand is now still 
pending for court approval, I think in December it has to be ap-
proved so we must have satisfied the accounting standards that 
it was a justifiable charge. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: OaK., now at this time we will 
be glad to hear testimony from anyone else who wishes to testify. 
Mrsa Frances Meyer spoke with me briefly at the beginning of the 
afternoon session and presented a letter to me with regard to pre-
payment penalties which is, of course, one of the major subjects 
of the interim study to which we have not yet gotten today, but 
we will be tomorrow, and the following day in San Diego. 
We have ample time now, Mrsa Meyer, if you would like 
to come forwarda We will be discussing it tomorrow, but that's 
fine, you come right up. 
MRS. FRANCES MEYER: My name is Mrs. Frances Meyer 
and I represent only me and I was only involved in this one real 
estate transaction, but I had been advised by the realtor that 
the Horne Savings would not waive any prepayment penalties which 
was evidentally a practice in the industry that if any savings 
and loan gets a new loan, they would waive the prepayment penalty. 
They told me that they didn't have that practice, yet another 
realtor told me that on several occasions Horne Savings had waived 
the prepayment penalty in transactions they handledo I had called 
the Senior Vice President of their main office in Los Angeles, and 
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he told me that if they all followed the same practice they would 
be considered as engaging in collusion on this, and when I tried 
to argue with him and told him that they evidentally weren't so 
meticulous about being charged with collusion, if they all charged 
the same interest rate on certificate accounts. But that didn't 
seem to make any differenceo Anyway, I had to pay the prepayment 
penalty which I thought was unfair in view of the fact that so 
many others don't do it. I didn't know whether there is a law in 
the State that gave them the discretion to do it or not. 
Also, this varies a little from the question of pre-
payment, but I again wondered why a real estate firm tried to use 
such pressure in getting to use their escrow company in a real 
estate transaction. They don't explain to you that you have a 
legal right to use any escrow company you wisho I happened to 
find this out quite by accident and found I saved myself almost 
$100 by having it done somewhere else, rather than with the escrow 
company. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Was it a real estate firm that 
tried to get you to use ••• 
MRS. MEYER: Their escrow company. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: O.K. 
MRS. MEYER: And I couldn't understand really why so 
many of the real estate firms have their own escrow companies, I 
know that they certainly must be licensed to, but a long time 
ago I had a very brief course in commercial law and was told that 
an escrow agent is usually one who acts as a disinterested third 
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party in transactions and I frankly can't see how anyone who is 
engaged in either the buying or helping you sell or helping you 
buy a place can be absolutely objective and, you know, out of 
the part of the transaction. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: When you tried to get the gentle-
man to waive your prepayment penalty, did he indicate any stan-
dards or measurements by which he was guided to determine who got 
a waiver or who didn't? Or did he just tell you he wasn't going 
to waive yours? 
MRS. MEYER: He just said that they didn't do it 
because they would be accused of cdlusion if they all followed 
the same practice. Yet, as I said, I found out from a second 
real estate company, that on occasion, they had had this company 
waive the prepayment for them, and so but nobody could find out 
what standards they use for or againsto 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: How long have you owned your 
home? 
MRSo MEYER: I had owned it a little over two years. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: And you paid about $278.50 pre-
payment chargeo 
MRS. MEYER: Yeso 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: OoKo Any questions? All righto 
Thank you very much, Mrso Meyero If anyone else would like to 
testify today representing any group or just yourself, please 
feel free to let me know. 
We will adjourn until 9:30 tomorrow morningo 
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